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MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar #5660 
Candice Anderson #7456 
370 East South Temple, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5678 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVID MELVIN, an individual, 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT 
(Declaratory Judgment Action) 
civil Ko&jimnifotfoJiz 
J u d g e<fe PAVE SVQJTC 
Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc., by and through its counsel Manning Curtis 
Bradshaw & Bednar, LLC, and pursuant to Rule 57 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
complains of Defendant David Melvin and seeks relief as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Franklin Covey") is a Utah corporation doing 
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Franklin Covey 
Co. 
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2. Defendant David Melvin ("Melvin") is a resident of the State of Maryland. Prior 
to September 12, 1997, Melvin was an employee of Franklin Covey. On one or more occasions 
during his employment with Franklin Covey Melvin worked and performed services in Utah and 
solicited customers in the State of Utah. Melvin is subject to the personal jurisdiction of this 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24. 
3. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§78-3-4 and 78-33-1. 
4. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-13-4, 78-13-6 
and 78-13-7. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. Prior to September 12,1997, Melvin was employed by Franklin Covey as an 
Account Executive. 
6. On September 12,1997, Melvin's employment with Franklin Covey was 
terminated. 
7. Prior to Melvin's separation, Franklin Covey had established a policy and practice 
providing that Account Executives were ineligible to receive commissions on seminars held or 
products sold subsequent to the effective date of the Account Executives1 termination (the 
"Commission Policy"). 
8. The Commission Policy is appropriate and justified because booked seminars may 
be canceled by Franklin Covey's client prior to the time the seminar is actually held, because the 
number of attendees for any given seminar may change up until the day of the seminar and 
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because there is on-going work associated with holding a seminar which continues until the 
seminar has been concluded. 
9. On November 13, 1997, approximately two months after his separation from 
Franklin Covey, Melvin received payment of $2,029.57 from Franklin Covey and signed a 
Release (the "Release") in which he released Franklin Covey "from all liability arising out of its 
failure to pay [Melvin] commissions for sales completed before [Melvin's] termination on 
September 12, 1997." A copy of the Release is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
10. On or about February 8,1998, approximately five months after Melvin's 
termination and approximately three months after Melvin executed the Release, Franklin Covey 
received a demand letter and Draft Complaint from legal counsel for Melvin demanding payment 
of compensation for potential future sales from prospective customers and asserting entitlement 
to commissions on seminars which may be held after the effective date of Melvin's resignation. 
Melvin's Draft Complaint demands payment of $600,000. Melvin threatens litigation if such 
commissions for potential future sales are not paid. A copy of the Draft Complaint is attached 
hereto as Exhibit B. 
11. Melvin's Draft Complaint acknowledges the Commission Policy by stating "[i]t 
was Franklin's practice not to pay commissions to Melvin until Franklin actually delivered the 
product or service." Exhibit B, f 7. 
12. Melvin admits in the Draft Complaint that he has been paid "commissions for all 
sales of services and products that were delivered before September 12,1997." Exhibit B, 18. 
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13. An actual justiciable controversy now exists between Franklin Covey and Melvin 
as to whether Melvin is entitled to receive compensation for potential future sales or for seminars 
held after the effective date of his termination. 
14. Franklin Covey is an interested party pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2, and 
is entitled to have determined the question of whether any obligation exists to pay compensation 
to Melvin for seminars held subsequent to the effective date of Melvin's termination and to 
obtain a declaration of the rights, obligations and status of the parties. 
15. By rendering a declaratory judgment or decree, the controversy giving rise to this 
proceeding will be terminated. 
CLAIM FOR REUgF 
(Declaratory Judgment) 
16. By this reference, Franklin Covey incorporates the averments previously set forth 
above as though fully set forth herein. 
17. Because Melvin has alleged entitlement to compensation and commission 
payments subsequent to the effective date of his termination, Franklin Covey is a "person 
interested" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2 and is entitled to have determined questions of 
construction, rights and obligations arising from Melvin's employment with Franklin Covey and 
to obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. 
18. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-5, a declaratory judgment will end the 
controversy arising under the Agreement. 
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PRAYER FOR RELIgF 
WHEREFORE, Franklin Covey seeks relief as follows: 
1. For a declaration of the rights, status, legal relations and obligations of the parties 
arising from Melvin's employment with Franklin Covey and Franklin Covey's Commission 
Policy, including a declaration that Franklin Covey has no obligation to pay Melvin 
compensation or commissions for potential future sales or for seminars scheduled or products 
sold subsequent to the effective date of Melvin's termination; and 
2. A declaration that the Release signed by Melvin on November 13, 1997 bars the 
claim asserted in Melvin's Draft Complaint (Exhibit B) as well as any and all other claims related 
to payment of compensation or commissions for services performed by Melvin during his 
employment with Franklin Covey; and 
3. A declaration that Franklin Covey's policy and practice with respect to the 
payment of commissions to separated account executives is otherwise not violative of law. 
DATED this \3r day of February, 1998. 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
&BEDNAR,LLC 
Plaintiffs Address: 
2200 West Parkway Blvd. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
Steven C. Bednar 
Candice Anderson 





I, David Mehrin, in consideration of the sum of $2,029.57 (less any applicable 
federal, state, and local taxes and other withholdings) hereby release Franklin Covey Co. 
from aU liability arising out of its failure to pay me commissions for sales completed 
before my termination on September 12,1997. This release becomes effective upon my 
receipt of payment in the amount of $2,029.57. For purposes of this release, any 
reference to Franklin Covey Co. also includes all officers and employees of Franklin 
Covey Co. as well; as any affiliated companies. \ 
Date: fiw^bju ii» \<m (4ux_ 
David Melvin 
NOU-13-1997 12:48 P. 004 
EXHIBIT B 
rv% 4-Vna r»4 Tircuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland 
or 
I the United States District Court for Maryland 
Greenbelt Division 
David Melvin 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Spring, Maryland 
Plaintiff 
v. 
Franklin Covey Company 
Serve: Hyrum W. Smith 
2200 West Parkway Blvd. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 
Defendant
 r_i :. 
Complaint 
(Contract) 
David Melvin, through his attorney, Mar1 Hessel, makes 
o . .• failure t , :.-i; - i . ^ commissions **.- ;\ * u^ 
made while employed by the defendant.--1 
IM r t. .1 ms 
1. The plaintiff, David Melvin ("Melvin"), i s an adult resident 
f Maryland residing at 812 Whittington Terrace, Silver Spring, 
• - .. 
2. The defendant, Franklin Covey Co,, inc. ("Franklir"x A~ i 
Utah corporatior ?ranklin does business the State 
Mary Land! ruin J neii of f: ices i in «"i!a i I 
1 
times relevant to this suit. 
Jurisdiction and Venue 
3- . s 
and Judiw. *: Proceedings Article-of the Annotated Code of 
Mary land. ! : ''•• \ 
* i | , 1 
or \ I / / 
Jurisdiction In this case is""based on or 2 8 U.S.C. § 1332. 
4 . •: _based..;Oi:i § § b-- J.\) I audi 6- ,J ,) 
Courts and Judicial Proceedings A r t i c l e of the .Annotated Code of 
I 'lary land!, \ "~"\ . 
or ,• •, ,„ \ x^ 
Venue in this court is based on 2 8 U.S.C § 1391. 
Facts 
5. Franklin is and for a period "of years has been, engaged in 
the business - selling personal productivi ty training, 
consul tinij bei v ices and pi udiira\s un.l inn it J » aI i o n a I I; apt; i .tini Il 
books. 
h The plaintiff, Melvin, was a; employee of Franklin or its 
y i edeccLiM HI «"i ninpan i *-.»b 1 i i nn • * • - - 1:.ember I ."' „ I "^"'l 7 . 
During this time, he was employed -%s - salesman and presenter. 
Melvin earned part or a] 1 of his compensation from Franklin in 
- r •" •• -. :ii : > i is — - ;—- -
wh±.~ employed by Franklin, Melvin was entitled to receive 
commission; sales that he was responsible for procuring. 
l en t i f ted IM:M t a i HI i i r i 'ruiiif ' "ii as 
accounts so that he would be paid a commission ™ »ny sales to 
those clients, whether or not the orders '+*-:* placed through 
•e i ommissions to 
Mel . uiu._ Franklin actually-delivered the product or service. 
8. Frank.in terminated Melvin from his employment with the 
Melvin 
y severance .,; v: compensation x;, onnection with Is 
terminate: Ai;t>^ Franklin terminated Melvin's employment, 
-sions for ii I I sal <=»:'. of services and 
products that were delivered before September L"
 P 1111, 
9. Franklin failed * pay Melvin commissions that he had earned 
iulci ihi. iiriit i art •. into prior t . 
employment, but for which Franklin had not ye - -Ielivered tl:ic-ji 
service product, 
*' • > ''•• 1J y 
requires salesmen ;.„^  contact a potential customer, spend hours 
learning about the customer's business, develop an understanding 
Hi" Un niut niiitM ti hi" i I ii it 11HI iiHf'ds nnI i ilinMtf» f IIP customer about 
how Franklin's services and products would meet the customei"s 
needs• u 
11. '-•- "at sales contracts 
are rarely signed when \ sales person ;fc:s(. contacts a 
prospective customer. Sales are made based oi I a relationship 
between tl customer m u Franklin that sales person develops. 
Competitor •-: ; -. . ;n have products and services that fi ] ] tl le 
same needs as Franklin's products and services, so the 
relationship that the sales person develops is a critical factor 
i n a sale. The relationship • help Franklin sell other 
produc t::s ' i e s p o n s it ble If i u I 1:1: le 
customer \e sales contracts..--"are often signed months or ev en 
years.after the sales person-does the work of developing the 
j'i e 1 a 1 1 o n i;«I in i \J u " ''"  <: 11 s t; o n i e i:. / ;' 
12. Melvin sper large percentage of his time meeting with 
prospective customers and educating them about Franklir 
ser v ices ai :i I pi: odi IC l::s He received i:i :::> • sompensatj on fc: > isa. 
efforts on Franklin's behalf. •__---:' 
Af *^*t eiq** customers placed orders - Franklin, 
ember 12, 19 - :, recei i i e 
the services or products before September Franklin 
failed to pay a commission to Mfelvin for these sales. These 
customers incl ude: // \ \ 
a. Northrop Grummon /{ 
b , A m o c o , I IK 
C . H h o n e Pou Lenc* r S '••• :7] 
d. Price Waterhouse 
e. Bell Atlantic 
f. c di_L 
g. A r a m a r k 
h . P e r s h i n g 
14 . Al I .Iin! one i u.sfomHr Be 1,1 ," " 'Jl •' • *'• " • " or J" ' 
with Franklin after September 12, 1997 -. , ._ • result 
Melvin's sales efforts, Franklin __-^  _ paid Melvi. a 
4 
commission on the Bellcore sales or any other sales to Melvin's 
accounts where the order was placed after September 12 ] 99.7, 
1 5 . • i t :: • iiH't'f 
with potent LaJ customers of-•Franklin to help develop a 
relationship. ? particular, Melvin met wi th representatives of 
< ihi Md I c i m i IIM 
efforts resultec , < :*• development of a major new customer for 
Frankl in Franklin has not compensated Melvin for his efforts 
] 6. At least some of the others-prospective customers that Melvin 
spent hi s time meeting wi th and educating wil 1 place orders with 
Frank] :ii i i Oi I September ] 2 1997" when Fr ankl :i i I tei in :i n a te • :il M e ] i i n, 
he had business proposals pending with approximately potential 
customers • There .<? ? * Lgh likelihood that a large percentage of 
these - - 1 i i 
"''ie neax future. Some of these prospective customers are listed 
• Exhibit 5 * *omplair * addition, Melvin had 
: :c x:i mate] j 539 • :: ther 
potential customers in his territory. There i s a hi gh likelihood 
th a significant percentage f these prospective customers will 
p] a< :::e 
approximately 613 prospective customers (including those found i n 
Exhibit I\ ) i s attached as Exhibit B to thi s complaint 
17 . f :: i: e- itica te ai id 
relationships with prospective customers, Frank * would not be 
making as many sales. 
5 
18. Franklin benefited from Melvin's sales efforts w n n 
prospective customers Franklin knew that Melvin was contacting 
and i»d11cat behalf 
:i 9 - Franklin accepted the benefit of Melvin's sales efforts on 
:i ts behalf and has profited from those efforts. Franklin did not 
comperibd! e H*-1 J : i i i 
Count I 
20. The plaintiff hereby restates and incorporates by reference 
i 11 J :::> f t: I: i € • a Il ] e g a t :1 :: i I s • z o n t a i n e d I 
complaint. ;.~r"-' 
Melvin made substantial effort 4* develop prospective 
•J.-..- to September --ink. -\ 
terminated employment. 
22. Benefits were conferred upbn Franklir result : 
M e ] :i :i: .•.-..: - • m a l 
sales. 
23. Franklin encouraged Melv:- * : develop prospective customers 
I ""1 Yl d l l k 1 i ii ' M S lllliik I I I . | .III i '" f f Ol t t O 
sell its products and services and .that it would receive orders 
as a res ii J t . ; : J 
24. f* i efforts without 
compensating 
. !• * - •-* inequitable i.-;r Franklin to retain the benefits 
-
 !
 unpensating him. 
Franklin had ,.... implied contract with Mel^--
commission on all sales he procured. Franklin breached the" 
implied contract with Melvin and was unjustly enriched as a 
] esu 1 1" . 
Wherefore/ the p l a i n t ! ff demands |iiui|iii<jm dh i u i i w. 
(a) compensatory damages in. the- amount of $600,000.00; and 
^j
 u n e r reiief that the court deems appropriate. 
i j 
_.. -Respectful 1 y submitted, 
.Mark L. Hesse1, Esq. 
Suite 307 
11501 Georgia Avenue 
Wheaton, Maryland 20902 
(301) 949-8364 
"Attorney for the plaintiff 
Demand Trial 
The plaintiff demands a jury',.trial ot \\\ issues in this 
case. 




MANNING CURTIS BRADSIIA W 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar #5660 
Candice Anderson #7456 
370 East South Temple, Suite .100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-5678 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, ) MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) Civil No. 2:98CV155 
DAVTD MELVIN, an individual, ) Judge Dee V. Benson 
Defendant. ) 
Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Franklin Covey") move* tin -. I 'uuil lm <m 
order granting summary judgment in this Declaratory Judgment Action. Franklin Covey seeks a 
declaration that it has no obligation to pay Plaintiff David Melvin ("Melvin") commissions for 
s.ilcs ol ptuducl'i .ind SC-IVH cs which n< cur after the termination of his employment from 
Franklin Covey. Franklin Covey is entitled to a declaratory judgment as a matter of law because 
the express terms oi Mdun's L-mplmiiiciil ,igu:eiiicnl innvuk's th.il Mclun wa> cnhilcii lo 





/ " * - 0 
U
 * ° ' « « / ..; 1 
5V:__ 
Dtp 
This Motion is supported by the accompanying Memorandum In Support of Motion for 
i i i inmur. Illiiiiiluijiieiil .irul llu i n h i b i t s a t t a c h e d thereto. 
DATED this 1 Oth of April, 1998. 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar 
Candice Anderson 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be mailed, postage prepaid, this /c ^ day of April, 1998 to the 
following: 
David Melvin 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Spring, MD 20902 
Mark L. Hessel, Esq. 
Suite 307 
11501 Georgia Avenue 
Wheaton, MD 20902 
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Tab 4 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar #5660 
Candice Anderson #7456 
370 East South Temple, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-5678 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, ] 
INC., a Utah corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. . ] 
DAVID MELVIN, an individual, 
Defendant. 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
> OF MOTION FOR 
} SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) CivilNo.2:98CV155 
i Judge Dee V. Benson 
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. ("Franklin Covey") respectfully submits this Memorandum In Support of 
Motion For Summary Judgment. Franklin Covey seeks a declaration that it has no obligation to 
pay Plaintiff David Melvin ("Melvin") commissions for sales of products and services which 
occur after the termination of his employment from Franklin Covey. Franklin Covey is entitled 
to a declaratory judgment as a matter of law because the express terms of Melvin's employment 
agreement provide that Melvin was entitled to payment "only for those services delivered while 
you are employed by Franklin." 
#4628 V I \ 
INTRODUCTION 
Melvin was employed by Franklin Covey as a salesman from January 1992 until 
September 12, 1997. Prior to the spring of 1997 Melvin was paid a base salary plus commission. 
In April 1997, Melvin was informed that his employment would be terminated for inadequate 
sales. Melvin requested to keep his job on a straight commission basis. Franklin Covey agreed 
and the parties executed an express agreement, which confirmed Franklin Covey's long-standing 
policy respecting payment of commissions as follows: "According to Franklin policy, 
commissions are paid only for those services delivered while you are employed by Franklin'' 
Melvin's employment was terminated on September 12,1997. It is undisputed that 
Melvin has received payment for all sales which occurred prior to his termination. However, 
Melvin now claims a quantum meruit entitlement to commissions on sales which occurred after 
his termination and to commission on potential future sales to my potential future customer with 
whom he had contact. Melvin's fantastic claim defies the law and the express Agreement which 
governs his compensation. Franklin Covey is entitled to a declaration that it has no obligation to 
pay Melvin commissions for sales or services delivered after the termination of his employment. 
#4628 2 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
This declaratory judgment action was precipitated by Melvin sending to Franklin Covey a 
draft complaint and threatening to sue unless Franklin Covey acquiesced to Melvin's ridiculous 
demand for payment of post-termination commissions. Franklin Covey filed this declaratory 
judgment action on February 13,1998, which was removed to this Court by Melvin. 
Approximately three weeks after this declaratory judgment action was filed, Melvin filed a 
complaint almost identical to the draft complaint in the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland (Melvin's "Maryland Complaint"). The following undisputed facts are 
drawn from Melvins' Maryland Complaint (Exhibit A),1 Melvin's Compensation Agreement 
(Exhibit B) and a Release signed by Melvin (Exhibit C). 
1. Melvin was employed as a Franklin Covey salesman from November 1,1995 
until September 12, 1997. Exhibit A, Md. Complaint 17. 
2. In April 1997, Melvin signed a Compensation Agreement confirming that his 
compensation structure was altered "from base + commission to straight commission." The 
Compensation Agreement expressly provided: "According to Franklin policy, commissions 
are paid only for those services delivered while you are employed by Franklin." Exhibit B, 
Compensation Agreement, p. 1 (emphasis added). 
Rather than answering this Declaratory Judgment Complaint, Melvin has chosen to file a Motion to 
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. As a result, undisputed facts in this Memorandum have been drawn from 
Melvin's Maryland Complaint rather than Melvin's responsive pleading in this action. 
#4628 3 
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3. Melvin's employment was terminated on September 12, 1997. "After Franklin 
terminated Melvin's employment, Franklin paid Melvin commissions for all sales of services and 
products that were delivered before September 12, 1997." Exhibit A, Md. Complaint f 9. 
Melvin signed a Release acknowledging receipt of payment "for sales completed before my 
termination on September 12, 997." Exhibit C, Release. 
4. Melvin's draft Complaint and the Maryland Complaint demand payment for sales 
or services delivered after Melvin's termination and commissions for my potential future sales to 
any potential future customers with whom Melvin alleges he had contact. See Exhibit B to the 
Complaint in this action; see also Exhibit A hereto. 
ARGUMENT 
Melvin's Quantum Meruit Claim is Precluded by the 
Express Agreement Governing Melvin's Compensation 
Franklin Covey seeks a declaration that it has no obligation to pay Melvin commissions 
for sales or services delivered after his termination.2 Franklin Covey is entitled to this 
declaratory relief because Melvin's claim for recovery under quantum meruit is, as a matter of 
law, absolutely precluded by the express agreement governing Melvin's compensation (Exhibit 
B). 
Specifically, the Complaint requests the following declaratory relief: 
1. For a declaration of the rights, status, legal relations and obligations of the parties arising from 
Melvin's employment with Franklin Covey and Franklin Covey's Commission Policy, including a declaration that 
Franklin Covey has no obligation to pay Melvin compensation or commissions for potential future sales or for 
seminars scheduled or products sold subsequent to the effective date of Melvin's termination; and 
2. A declaration that the Release signed by Melvin on November 13, 1997 bars the claim asserted in 
Melvin's Draft Complaint (Exhibit B) as well as any and all other claims related to payment of compensation or 
commissions for services performed by Melvin during his employment with Franklin Covey; and 
3. A declaration that Franklin Covey's policy and practice with respect to the payment of 
commissions to separated account executives is otherwise not violative of law. 
#4628 4 
According to the express agreement governing Melvin's compensation (and Franklin 
Covey's undisputed policy), Melvin was to be paid commissions "only for those products and 
services delivered while [he was] employed by Franklin." Exhibit B, Compensation Agreement 
p. 1. Melvin accepted and signed the Compensation Agreement. Id. 
It is undisputed that Melvin has been paid all commissions for services and products 
delivered as of the date of termination. Exhibit A, Md. Complaint at % 9 ("After Franklin 
terminated Melvin's employment, Franklin paid Melvin commissions for all sales of services and 
products that were delivered before September 12, 1997"); see also Exhibit C, Release ("I, David 
Melvin, in consideration of the sum of $2,029.57... release Franklin Covey Co. from all liability 
arising out of its failure to pay me commissions for sales completed before my termination on 
September 12,1997."). Melvin cannot contend that he is owed commissions for any sales or 
services delivered prior to his termination date and his Compensation Agreement absolutely 
forecloses any claim for commissions after his termination date. 
Melvin's only argument to receive post-termination commissions is raised under quantum 
meruit3. This claim is frivolous because a claim under "quantum meruit presupposes that no 
enforceable written or oral contract exists." Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264,268 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1987). See also, Concrete Products Co. v. Salt Lake County, 734 P.2d 910, 911 (Utah 1987) 
("Unjust enrichment is a doctrine under which the law will imply a promise to pay for goods or 
services when there is neither an actual nor an implied contract between the parties."); Davies, 
Melvin's draft Complaint (Exhibit B to the Declaratory Judgment Complaint) and Melvin's Maryland 
Complaint (Exhibit A hereto) confuses the distinction between a claim for unjust enrichment and a claim for 
implied-contract, both of which are different species of quantum meruit, but each of which are absolutely barred by 
the existence of an express agreement. See Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 268-269 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987). 
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746 P.2d at 268 ("Quantum meruit is an action initiated by a plaintiff to recover payment for 
labor performed in a variety of circumstances in which that plaintiff, for some reason, would not 
be able to sue on an express contract."). This same principle governs under Maryland as well as 
Utah law. Mass Transit Admin, v. Granite Constr. Co., 471 A.2d 1121, 1126 (Md. Ct. App. 
1984) ("When there is an express construct dealing specifically with the services rendered, 
quantum meruit is unavailable."). 
Melvin's Compensation Agreement is an express agreement, the terms of which deal 
precisely with the circumstances under which Melvin is entitled to commissions. That express 
agreement limits compensation to commission for services and products delivered as of the date 
of termination. Melvin has received payment according to those precise terms. Melvinfs 
quantum meruit claim is instantly and totally decimated by the existence of that express 
agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
Melvin acknowledges that he is owed no commissions for any sales or services delivered 
prior to his termination. Melvinfs Compensation Agreement absolutely forecloses any claim for 
commissions after his termination date. Summary judgment should be granted in favor of 
Franklin Covey and a Declaratory Judgment entered granting the relief requested in Franklin 
Covey's Complaint. 
\w> 
DATED this 10th day of April 1998. 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar 
Candice Anderson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client 
Sales, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 
10th day of April 1998, to the following: 
David Melvin 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Spring, MD 20902 
Mark L. Hessel, Esq. 
Suite 307 
11501 Georgia Avenue 
Wheaton, MD 20902 
^ Y ^ ^ LC 7-^L 
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EXHIBIT A 
In the United States District Cou2ffc:£or Maryland^ 
Greenbelt Division 
1^3 m -3 P 2- U3 
WORKING CQP) 
David Melvin 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Spring, Maryland 20902 
Plaintiff 
v. 
Franklin Covey Company 
2200 West Parkway Blvd. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
and 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc, 
2200 West Parkway Blvd. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
Defendants 
Civil Case No ./rt'V (,5S 
Complaint 
(Contract and Declaratory Judgment) 
David Melvin, through his attorney, Mark L. Hessel, makes 
the following complaint against the defendants, Franklin Covey 
Co. and Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. for failure to pay 
sales commissions on sales that he made while employed by 
Franklin Covey Co. under Maryland common law and for declaratory 
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 that the defendants are obligated 
to pay commissions to the plaintiff on future sales for a period 
of time. 
Parties 
1. The plaintiff, David Melvin ("Melvin"), is an adult resident 




2. The defendant, Franklin Covey Co. ("Franklin") is a Utah 
corporation. Franklin does business in the State of Maryland and 
maintained offices in Gaithersburg, Maryland at all times 
relevant to this suit. 
3. The defendant, Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Client 
Sales") is a Utah corporation. On information and belief, Client 
Sales is a wholly owned subsidiary of Franklin. Client Sales is 
registered to do business in Maryland. Client Sales maintains 
that it has an interest in the plaintiff's claim against 
Franklin. 
Jurisdiction and Venue 
4. Jurisdiction in this case is based on or 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
5. Venue in this court is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 
Facts 
6. Franklin is, and for a period of years has been, engaged in 
the business of selling personal productivity training, 
consulting services and products, and motivational tapes and 
books. 
7. The plaintiff, Melvin, was an employee of Franklin or its 
predecessor companies from January 1992 to September 12, 1997. 
During this time, he was employed as a salesman and presenter. 
Melvin earned part or all of his compensation from Franklin in 
the form of commissions. 
8. While employed by Franklin, Melvin was entitled to receive 
commissions on all sales that he was responsible for procuring. 
2 
Franklin internally identified certain accounts as Melvin's 
accounts so that he would be paid a commission on any sales to 
those clients, whether or not the orders were placed through 
Melvin. Franklin did not usually pay commissions to* Melvin until 
Franklin actually delivered the product or service. 
9. Franklin terminated Melvin from his employment with the 
company as of September 12, 1997. Franklin did not pay Melvin 
any severance or other compensation in connection with his 
termination. After Franklin terminated Melvin's employment, 
Franklin paid Melvin commissions for all sales of services and 
products that were delivered before September 12, 1997. 
10. Franklin failed to pay Melvin commissions that he had earned 
on sales contracts entered into prior to the termination of his 
employment, but for which Franklin had not yet delivered the 
service or product. 
11. The sale of Franklin's products and services generally 
requires salesmen to contact a potential customer, spend hours 
learning about the customer's business, develop an understanding 
of the customer's training needs, and educate the customer about 
how Franklin's services and products would meet the customer's 
needs. 
12. It is the nature of Franklin's business that sales contracts 
are rarely signed when the sales person first contacts a 
prospective customer. Sales are made based on a relationship 
between the customer and Franklin that the sales person develops. 
Competitors of Franklin have products and services that fill the 
3 
same needs as Franklin's products and services, so the 
relationship that the sales person develops is a critical factor 
in a sale. The relationship may also help Franklin sell other 
products that the sales person is not responsible for to the 
customer. The sales contracts are often signed months or even 
years after the sales person does the work of developing the 
relationship with the customer. 
13. Melvin spent a large percentage of his time meeting with 
prospective customers and educating them about Franklin's 
services and products. He received no compensation for these 
efforts on Franklin's behalf. 
14. At least eight customers placed orders with Franklin, 
through Melvin, before September 12, 1997, but did not receive 
the services or products before September 12, 1997. Franklin 














Giant Foods, Inc. 
Aramark 
Pershing 
15. At least one customer, Bellcore, placed one or more orders 
with Franklin after September 12, 1997 as a direct result of 
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Melvin's sales efforts, Franklin has not paid Melvin a 
commission on the Bellcore sales or any other sales to Melvin's 
accounts where the order was placed after September 12, 1997. 
16. On one or more ocassions, Melvin traveled to Utah to meet 
with potential customers of Franklin to help develop a 
relationship. In particular, Melvin met with representatives of 
GEC-Marconi Hazeltine in Salt Lake City in May 1997. Melvin's 
efforts resulted in the development of a major new customer for 
Franklin. Franklin has not compensated Melvin for his efforts 
with GEC-Marconi Hazeltine. 
17. At least some of the other prospective customers that Melvin 
spent his time meeting with and educating will place orders with 
Franklin. On September 12, 1997 when Franklin terminated Melvin, 
he had business proposals pending with approximately 74 potential 
customers. There is a high likelihood that a large percentage of 
these prospective customers will place orders with Franklin in 
the near future. Some of these prospective customers are listed 
in Exhibit A to this complaint. In addition, Melvin had 
developed business contacts with approximately 539 other 
potential customers in his territory. There is a high likelihood 
that a significant percentage of these prospective customers will 
place orders with Franklin in the near future. A list of 
approximately 613 prospective customers (including those found in 
Exhibit-A) is attached as Exhibit B to this complaint. 
18. But for Melvin's efforts to educate and develop 
relationships with prospective customers, Franklin would not be 
5 
making as many sales. 
19. Franklin benefited from Melvin's sales efforts with 
prospective customers. Franklin knew that Melvin was contactdLng 
and educating prospective customers on Franklin's behalf. 
20. Franklin accepted the benefit of Melvin's sales efforts on 
its behalf and has profited from those efforts. Franklin did not 
compensate Melvin in any way for his efforts. 
Count I 
(Contract) 
21. The plaintiff hereby restates and incorporates by reference 
all of the allegations contained in the other paragraphs of this 
complaint. 
22. Melvin made a substantial effort to develop prospective 
clients for Franklin prior to September 12, 1997 when Franklin 
terminated his employment. 
23. Benefits were conferred upon Franklin as a result of 
Melvin's efforts. These benefits were in the form of additional 
sales. 
24. Franklin encouraged Melvin to develop prospective customers 
for Franklin. Franklin knew that Melvin was making an effort to 
sell its products and services and that it would receive orders 
as a result. 
25. Franklin accepted the benefits of Melvin's efforts without 
compensating him. 
26. It would be inequitable for Franklin to retain the benefits 
of Melvin's efforts without compensating him. 
6 
27. Franklin had an implied contract with Melvin to pay him a 
commission on all sales he procured. Franklin breached the 
implied contract with Melvin and was unjustly enriched as a 
result. 
Wherefore, the plaintiff demands judgment as follows: 
(a) compensatory damages in the amount of $600,000.00; and 
(b) any other relief that the court deems appropriate. 
Count II 
(Declaratory Judgment) 
28. The plaintiff hereby restates and incorporates by reference 
all of the allegations contained in the other paragraphs of this 
complaint. 
29. Some of the sales, for which the plaintiff is claiming a 
right to compensation, will not be known until some time in the 
future. As such it may not be possible to establish fixed 
amounts of damages at trial.
 f 
30. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, this court may grant a declaratory 
judgment to the plaintiff to establish the plaintiff's right to 
receive compensation, even when the exact amount of the 
compensation is not known. 
Wherefore, the plaintiff demands judgment as follows: 
(a) declaratory judgment that the plaintiff is entitled to 
compensation at a given rate for future purchases that his 
customers make from the defendants; and 




Mark L. Hessel, Esq. 
Suite 307 
11501 Georgia Avenue 
Wheaton, Maryland 20902 
(301) 949-8364 
Attorney for the plaintiff 
Demand for Jury Trial 
The plaintiff demands a jury trial of all issues in this 
case. . 
r\cu ricaul 
Mark L. Hessel, Esq. 
8 
EXHIBIT B 
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April 9, 1997 
OavidMelvin 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Springs, MD 20901 
Oear Oavid: 
This letter will oonfirm your conversation with Jeff Shumway on April 8, 1997, where you 
discussed the terms of your continued smployment with Franklin under a new 
compensation structure. Specifically: 
• Effective Date: This change will be effective Aprff 5,1997. 
• Compensation; Your compensation structure will move from-base + 
commission to straight commission. Your commission shall be nine percent of 
the net contribution of anything you self. Commission shall be paid on the 20* 
of the month following the month in which services are delivered. According to 
FranWIn policy, commissions are paid only for those services delivered while 
you are employed by FrankHn. 
As discussed, the commission percentage will be adjusted to seventeen percent 
when your sales exceed the $650,000 goal established for the year. 
• Office and Phone: Franklin agrees to provide an office and phone in our 
Qa'rthersburg facility for your use. You may continue to use the AT&T phone 
card when you are traveling or making client calls from home. 
• Travel Budget: You may continue to use (he existing travel budget Please 
approve all travel through Matt King, 
• Benefits: Your medical, dental, and life insurance benefits wtll continue at your 
current levels. As a fully commissioned employee, you will not accrue personal 
time nor wilt you receive holiday or floating holiday pay. Payment for personal 
time accrued up through April 4,1997. has been paid with your final check as a 
salaried employee. 
• Potential to Renegotiate the Agreement: This agreement may be 
renegotiated at the end of the fiscal year, based on individual and company 
performance. 
qwpppybatw 
Your responsibilities will continue to focus on sales and business development. Your 
responsibilities will be subject to change from time to time as the company goes 
forward. •-:*:•* an» ** 
Third Door 
noa v.\:*: *»3rx^«y R*u!**Krc 
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Your employment with Franklin will be on an at-will basis. This m%Mm that your 
employment is completely voluntary and for an indefinite term and th*t it may be 
terminated by you or by franklin at any Dme, for any reason or for no reason, and with 
or without advance notice. Your status as en at-will employee may not be changed or 
modified by any oral representations to the contrary made by any supervisor, officer, or 
other employer or agent of Franklin, by any practice or procedure of Franklin or in the 
industry in which you are employed, and/or by any policy manual or other document 
issued by Franklin, EXCEPT rf a written employment contract is executed by you and by 
the president of Franklin which specifically revokes the employment at-will relationship. 
No manager, supervisor, officer or other employee of FrankRn has the power or 
authority, either verbaOy or In witting, to alter the employee at-will relationship except as 
specifically described in this paragraph. 
Confidentiality and Covenant Not to Compete 
Your current Employment Agreement Is stffl valid and in force. 
If you accept this offer of employment on the terms and conditions set forth in this letter 
and the accompanying Employment Agreement, please sign this letter In the space 
Indicated below and return it to terrain Smith, FranWIn Quest Consulting Group, 2200 
West Parkway Boulevard, Third ROOT. Salt Lake City, UT 84119. 
oincereiy, 
Jj^/c.lJmi'^^ 
John R. Harding 
Sr» Vice President 
AGREED AND ACCEPTED this 





I, David Melvin, in consideration of the smn of $2,02957 (less any applicable 
federal, state, and local taxes and other withholdings) hereby release Franklin Covey Co. 
from all liability arising out of its failure to pay me commissions for sales completed 
before my termination on September 12,1997. This release becomes effective upon my 
receipt of payment in the amount of $2,029.57. For purposes of this release, any 
reference to Franlclm Covey Co. also includes all officers and employees of Franklin 
Covey Co. as well; as any affiliated companies. \ 
Date: AnaJk* ft* i<m . (AxuL 
David Melvin 
\ 
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MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar #5660 
Candice Anderson #7456 
370 East South Temple, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-5678 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVID MELVIN, an individual, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OR TO CHANGE VENUE 
Civil No. 2:98CV00155B 
Judge Dee V. Benson 
Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Franklin Covey") respectfully submits this 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Change 
Venue.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant David Melvin ("Melvin"), a former salesman of Franklin Covey, has moved to 
dismiss Franklin Covey's Declaratory Judgment Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. In 
the alternative, he asks that this case be transferred to the United States District Court for the 
Melvin's Memorandum in Support of his Motion ("Melvin Memo.") contains 17 pages of argument and is 
therefore in violation of DUCivR 7-1(b)(3) 
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District of Maryland where Melvin, three weeks after the filing of this action, filed a 
substantially identical lawsuit against Franklin Covey. 
Melvin's jurisdictional argument is patently frivolous. Melvin's Declaration2 recites ten 
trips to Utah specifically related to his employment. More importantly, Melvinfs draft Complaint 
(which prompted this declaratory judgment action) and the Complaint filed by Melvin in 
Maryland both allege specific work that Melvin performed in Utah for which he now demands 
compensation. Melvin's own pleadings allege direct and specific contact with this forum; and 
part of his claim against Franklin Covey "arises out of1 these exact same contacts. This is a 
classic case of "arising out of specific jurisdiction. Melvin's argument to avoid personal 
jurisdiction is duplicitous and completely at odds with his own pleadings. 
Melvin's request to change venue is also ill-founded. Melvin has not contested that venue 
is properly laid in this Court (and the time to file any such motion under FRCP 12(b)(3) has 
passed). Rather, Melvin requests this action to be transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404. This 
request fails because Melvin has offered no support for his contention that the District of 
Maryland is a sufficiently more convenient forum. 
Melvin's motions are a disingenuous tactical ploy. This declaratory judgment action was 
filed in Utah State Court because Melvin, shortly after settling his claim for commissions and 
executing a Release, threatened to sue Franklin Covey again, boasting that the Release (drafted 
by his own lawyer) did not bar a claim for post-termination compensation. Melvin's effort to 
The "Declaration of David Melvin" submitted in support of Melvin's motion does not comply with the 
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1746 because it does not recite that it is made "under penalty of perjury." 28 U.S.C. § 
1746(1). The Court is therefore free to disregard Mr. Melvin's Declaration. 
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extort Franklin Covey a second time failed. Rather than wait for Melvin to make good on his 
threat, Franklin Covey initiated this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration Franklin 
Covey has no obligation to pay post-termination commissions. Melvin first removed this 
declaratory judgment action case to this Court. Melvin now asks this Court not to hear the case, 
but to transfer it to Maryland. Melvin is attempting to misuse this Court as nothing more than a 
weigh station. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Melvin was employed as a Franklin Covey salesman from 1992 until September 
12,1997. Exhibit A, Melvin's Maryland Complaint, 11? 
2. Following his termination, Franklin Covey and Melvin disputed the amount of 
commissions owed to Melvin. In November 1997, Franklin Covey paid Melvin $2,029.57. 
Melvin signed a Release, prepared by Melvin's counsel, releasing Franklin Covey from "all 
liability arising out of its failure to pay [Melvin] commissions for sales completed before 
[Melvin's] termination on September 12,1997." Exhibit B, Release. 
3. Three months after executing the Release, acting through the same legal counsel, 
Melvin made a new demand on and sent a draft Complaint to Franklin Covey demanding 
payment of additional commissions for services that might be delivered after the effective date of 
his termination. See Exhibit B to Complaint. 
Because Melvin has not filed an answer to the allegations of the Declaratory Judgment Complaint, many 
of the facts stated in this Memorandum are drawn from Melvin's Maryland Complaint. Melvin will certainly not 
dispute his own allegations. 
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4. On February 13,1998, Franklin Covey filed the instant action in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah (the "Utah Action"). 
5. On March 3,1998, Melvin filed his Maryland Complaint in the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland (Civ. Case No. AW-98-655) ("Maryland Complaint"). 
Exhibit A. 
6. In his Maryland Complaint, Melvin alleges that: 
On one or more occasions, Melvin traveled to Utah to meet 
with potential customers of Franklin Covey to help develop 
a relationship. In particular, Melvin met with 
representatives of GEC-Marconi Hazeltine in Salt Lake 
City in May 1997. Melvin's efforts resulted in the 
development of a major new customer for Franklin Covey. 
Franklin Covey has not compensated Melvin for his efforts 
with GEC-Marconi. 
Maryland Complaint f 16 (emphasis added). 
7. On March 9, 1998, Melvin filed a Notice of Removal, removing the Utah Action 
to this Court. 
8. On April 10, 1998, Franklin Covey filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in the 
Utah Action contending that Melvin's quantum meruit claim is absolutely barred by the existence 
of Melvin's express compensation agreement, which recites: "commissions are paid only for 
those services delivered while you are employed by Franklin." 
Doc. 5081 iv 
ARGUMENT 
I. MELVIN IS SUBJECT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION BECAUSE HE SEEKS 
COMPENSATION "ARISING OUT OF" HIS CONTACTS WITH UTAH. 
Melvin's Declaration admits ten trips to Utah directly related to his employment. Melvin 
Declaration, p. 2. Melvin has filed a pleading alleging that he procured a "major new customer" 
for Franklin Covey while in Utah and demanding compensation for his work in Utah. Exhibit A, 
Maryland Complaint, f 16. Melvin?s Memorandum and Declaration acknowledge that Melvin 
has had significant contacts with Utah. This Court possesses specific personal jurisdiction over 
Melvin and Melvin's argument to the contrary is frivolous. 
Under Utah law, a three-part inquiry is used to determine whether specific jurisdiction 
exists: "(1) the defendant's acts or contacts must satisfy the Utah long-arm statute; (2) a 'nexus1 
must exist between the plaintiffs claims and the defendant's acts or contacts; and (3) application 
of the Utah long-arm statute must satisfy the requirements of federal due process." 
Harnischfeger Engr's, Inc. v. Uniflo Conveyor, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 608, 612 (D. Utah 1995).4 
A. Melvin Has "Transacted Business" Under the Utah Long-Arm Statute. 
The Utah long-arm statute is satisfied if Melvin has "transacted] any business within the 
state." Utah Code Ann § 78-27-24(a). A person transacts business when he engages in any 
activity which "affect persons or businesses within the state of Utah." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
23. This is a "broad definition which invites liberal application." Far West Capital Inc. v. 
Towne, 828 F. Supp. 909, 912 (D. Utah 1993), affd, 46 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1995). This Court 
4Melvin's Memorandum argues at length that he is not subject to general jurisdiction. This is not disputed. 
Melvin does not have such "continuous and systematic contacts" with this forum such that he could be haled into a 
Utah court on matters unrelated to his dealings with Franklin Covey. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, 
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984). 
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has interpreted this provision broadly, holding that a defendant need not be present in the state in 
order to transact business in Utah, Brown v. Washoe Housing Auth.f 625 F. Supp. 595, 599 (D. 
Utah 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 835 F.2d 1327 (10th Cir. 1988). Even a single phone call to 
a Utah resident is sufficient to satisfy the "transacting business" threshold because such a call 
"affects persons and businesses within the State of Utah." Nova Mud Corp. v. Fletcher, 648 F. 
Supp. 1123,1126 (D. Utah 1986). 
Melvin "transacted business" in Utah under the long-arm statute. He made ten trips to 
Utah to conduct business here, he was an employee of a Utah resident, his direct supervisor was 
in Utah during the first year of his employment, and he acknowledges having regularly spoken 
with other Franklin Covey employees in Utah. Melvin Memo, at p.2. Melvin's conduct clearly 
falls within the broad parameters of the Utah long-arm statute. 
B. There is a "Nexus" Between Melvinfs Contacts With Utah and the Claims 
Raised in the Declaratory Judgment Action 
The "nexus" requirement is satisfied when a non-resident engages in conduct within the 
state and the plaintiffs claims against the defendant "arise from" that conduct. Harnischfeger, 
833 F. Supp. at 617-18; see also National Petroleum Marketing, Inc. v. Phoenix Fuel Co., 902 F. 
Supp. 1459, 1472-73 (D. Utah 1995). Melvin's own pleadings conclusively establish that this 
prong is satisfied. 
Melvin's Maryland Complaint and Melvin's Declaration acknowledge that he traveled to 
Utah on at lease ten separate occasions and that he transacted business with Franklin Covey 
while in Utah. Exhibit A, Maryland Complaint \ 16; Melvin Decl. ^  6. Melvin further 
acknowledges that he corresponded with coworkers in Utah in order make sales in his assigned 
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territory. Melvin Memo, at 2. Most significantly, Melvin pleads in his own Maryland 
Complaint that 
On one or more occasions, Melvin traveled to Utah to meet with 
potential customers of Franklin Covey to help develop a 
relationship. In particular, Melvin met with representatives of 
GEC-Marconi Hazeltine in Salt Lake City in May 1997. Melvin's 
efforts resulted in the development of a major new customer for 
Franklin. Franklin has not compensated Melvin for his efforts with 
GEC-Marconi Hazeltine. 
Exhibit A, Maryland Complaint, 1fl[ 20,24-27. Melvin seeks compensation for work performed 
in Utah. Melvin's quantum meruit claim has a direct, immediate, and inescapable nexus to his 
contacts with Utah. 
C. This Court's Exercise of Jui isdiction < miiporls nilli (li« Requirements \nl 
Federal Due Process 
Due process is satisfied when an individual has "fair warning that a particular activity 
may subject him to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 
218 (1977). This requirement is satisfied when, as here, "the defendant has purposefully directed 
his activities at residents of the forum and litigation results from alleged injuries that 'arise out of 
or relate to' these activities." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). Due 
process mandates consideration of "(1) whether the cause of action arises out of or has a 
substantial connection with the activity; (2) the balance of the convenience of the parties and the 
interest of the State in assuming jurisdiction; and (3) the character of the defendant's activities 
within the State." TedR. Brown & Assoc, v. Carnes Corp., 611 P.2d 378, 380 (Utah 1980). 
Melvin cannot have it both ways. He alleges in his Maryland Complaint that he came to 
Utah "on one or more occasions" to help develop a relationship with existing or potential clients. 
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He now asks the Court to take seriously his argument that he "transacted no business in Utah." 
Melvin Memo, at 4. Melvin is asserting a claim against Franklin Covey that derives directly 
from his contacts with this forum. He came here to conduct business, he conducted business, and 
now he demands payment for what he did here. That is "purposeful availment." Melvin simply 
cannot say that he has not had "fair warning" that he would be haled before a Utah court for 
matters related to the work he alleges he performed here. 
II. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THIS COURT TO DECLINE RULING ON 
FRANKLIN COVEY'S DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CLAIM 
Melvin asks this Court to exercise its discretion not to render a declaratory judgment on 
the basis that (1) any ruling by this Court will not be fully dispositive; and (2) Franklin Covey is 
not in need of immediate relief, but has simply raced Melvin to the courthouse to inflict hardship 
on Melvin.5 Neither of these arguments has merit. 
A. This Declaratory Judgment Action is Fully Dispositive 
Melvin contends this action may not be fully dispositive because if the Court finds that 
Melvin is entitled to post-termination commissions then the parties will have to litigate the issue 
of damages in some other court. This argument is frivolous. Any claim Melvin may have for 
damages "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of [Franklin 
Covey's] claim" and is therefore a compulsory counterclaim which Melvin must either raise in 
5Melvin's argument mistakenly assumes that the discretion extant under the federal declaratory judgment 
statute (28 U.S.C. § 2201) applies to this case. In fact, this action was brought under the Utah Declaratory Judgment 
Act, which restricts discretion to deny the relief requested only when the judgment "would not terminate the 
uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding." Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-6. Because this is a diversity 
case, the Court is required to apply state substantively law. If the federal declaratory judgment statute affords 
broader discretion to deny relief than the state statute, then the state statute must be applied. 
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this action or forfeit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a). Mr. Melvin's assertion that the "matter would go 
forward in Maryland" (Memo. p. 9) is also dead wrong because issues folly and fairly litigated 
here are subject to collateral estoppel in the Maryland Action. Because this case is folly 
dispositive of the controversy, there is no basis for this Court to refuse to hear the action. 
B. Franklin is In Immnliate Mcni of Declaiaton RHief 
Melvin contends that Franklin does not need declaratory relief "to avoid accrual of 
damages," but has simply filed this action in Utah to inflict hardship on Melvin. Melvin fails to 
recognize that Franklin Covey must know immediately to whom commissions should be paid. 
Melvin also mischaracterizes his "race to the courthouse" allegations to make himself appear 
sympathetic. 
Citing Great American Ins. v. Houston General, 735 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y 1990), 
Melvin contends that this case defies the purpose of declaratory relief because Franklin Covey is 
not in a position of having to "avoid accrual of avoidable damages" based on uncertainty of its 
rights. This is wrong. Melvin lays claim to post-termination commissions. Under Franklin 
Covey's policy, the commissions Melvin seeks are paid to current employees. If Melvin were 
found to be entitled to those same commissions, Franklin Covey would be in a position of having 
to pay the same commission twice, once to a current and once to a former employee. Holding 
commissions in abeyance or risking double payment involves the accrual of "avoidable 
damages." Franklin has a significant interest in resolving this dispute immediately. 
Melvin's "race to the courthouse" argument fares no better. Melvin contends that 
Franklin Covey learned of Melvin's claims through amicable correspondence from his counsel 
and then quickly filed a declaratory judgment action in Utah so as to inflict hardship on Melvin. 
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Melvin attempts to analogize this case to Great American Ins. Co. v. Houston General Ins. Co., 
735 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Melvin's argument is factually misleading and legally 
meritless. 
In Great American, the declaratory judgment plaintiff, Great American, had received a 
letter from the defendant, Houston General, threatening Great American with suit if it did not 
make payment of an amount allegedly due to Houston. Great American responded by 
acknowledging some limited liability and seeking a 60-day extension within which to evaluate its 
claims. Two days later, Great American filed a declaratory judgment action against Houston 
General and then sought and obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting Houston General 
from filing its suit against Great American.6 Id. at 583. The district court held that Great 
American's deceitful and manipulative tactic warranted dismissal of the declaratory judgment 
action. Id. at 586. 
This case bears no similarity to Great American. Franklin Covey did nothing to mislead 
Melvin or to interfere with his ability to file his lawsuit in Maryland. Franklin Covey made no 
representations to Melvin to cause him to sit on his rights. Two forums were available in which 
to file and Franklin Covey chose Utah while Melvin chose Maryland. There is nothing sinister 
or improper about Franklin Covey's decision to file this declaratory judgment action and to select 
Utah as its forum. 
\jpon expiration of the TRO, the district court refused to enter a preliminary injunction against Houston 
General. Subsequently, Houston General filed its own coercive action against Great American and moved that 
Great American's declaratory judgment be dismissed or transferred and consolidated. Great American, 735 F. Supp. 
at 583. 
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The history of this dispute also sets this case apart from Great American and explains 
Franklin Covey's desire to bring about quick resolution of the case. Melvin's counsel threatened 
suit against Franklin Covey once before, contending that Franklin Covey had shorted Melvin on 
pre-termination commissions. Franklin Covey denied liability but made a cash payment to 
Melvin and Melvin executed a "Release," prepared by his counsel. rhen, a mere three months 
after "settling" with Franklin Covey, Melvin and his counsel returned again to the well, making 
new demands upon Franklin Covey, now seeking payment in excess of $600,000 (in 
contravention Melvinfs express compensation agreement) for post-termination commissions. 
Franklin Covey's response was one of incredulity, having been blind sided by Melvin and his 
counsel after good faith negotiations and settlement. Rather than wait for Melvin to make good 
on his new extortive threat, Franklin Covey responded with the filing of this declaratory 
judgment action.7 
HI. THIS CASE SHOULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO MARYLAND 
Without contesting the propriety of venue, Melvin asks this Court to ignore Franklin 
Covey's legitimate choice of forum and transfer this case to Maryland. In support of this 
argument, Melvin submits an invalid and unsworn declaration which offers only conclusory 
assertions. 
During the negotiations leading up to the November 13 settlement, Melvin did not at any time suggest to 
Franklin Covey that, notwithstanding Franklin Covey policy to the contrary, he believed that he was entitled to 
commissions on sales made after he was terminated. If, as Melvin now claims, he has acted in good faith and 
attempted to resolve this matter "short of litigation," the logical question remains why he did not raise the instant 
claims in the context of the prior settlement negotiations and why he chose instead to remain silent until after 
receiving payment from Franklin Covey. 
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A party seeking transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) bears the burden of proving that the 
forum is sufficiently inconvenient. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 
1509,1515 (10th Cir. 1991). Among the factors to be considered by the Court in ruling on the 
motion are: 
the plaintiffs choice of forum; the accessability of witnesses and 
other sources of proof, including the availability of compulsory 
process to insure attendance of witnesses; the cost of making the 
necessary proof; questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if 
one is obtained; relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial; 
difficulties that may arise from congested dockets; the possibility 
of the existence of questions arising in the area of conflict of laws; 
the advantage of having a local court determine questions of local 
law; and all other considerations of a practical nature that make a 
trial easy, expeditious and economical. 
Id. at 1516. "Unless the balance is strongly in favor of the movant, the plaintiffs choice of 
forum should rarely be disturbed." William A. Smith Contracting Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 
467 F.2d 662, 664 (10th Cir. 1972) (emphasis added). 
In Scheldt v. Klein, 956 F.2d 963 (10th Cir. 1992), the Tenth Circuit rejected precisely the 
same arguments being raised in this case by Melvin. In arguing for transfer from Oklahoma to 
Florida, the defendant in Scheidt claimed that (1) the majority of the witnesses were in Florida, 
(2) the pertinent documentary evidence was in Florida, and (3) the conduct at issue occurred in 
Florida and would be evaluated under Florida law. Id. at 965. Like Melvin, the defendant in 
Scheidt submitted a conclusory affidavit in support of his motion. The Tenth Circuit upheld 
denial of the motion to transfer, holding that the defendant's "meager showing" failed to 
demonstrate the degree of inconvenience necessary to transfer an action and that the applicability 
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of Florida law did not present a ground for transfer due to the relatively simple claims asserted. 
Id. \ it 965-66 8 
In this case, Melvin makes the exact same arguments as the defendant in Scheldt and his 
arguments fa the exact same reasons I ike the defendant in Scheldt, Melvin makes no effort 
to identify who he intends to call as witnesses at trial-he merely makes conclusory assertions 
regarding "categories" of witnesses who might be called at trial. Melvin Decl. f 9. Melvin does 
not provide any information regarding what these \ inidentified witnesses Hill H'stify to »»r why 
their testimony might be material. Melvin presents no explanation as to why the deposition 
testimon.) of these unknot n witnesses (which would be obtained w ithin 100 miles from 'their 
home, Fed R. Civ. P. 45(b)(2)) could not be used at trial. Melvin states in his Memorandum that 
Maryland is the preferred forum because of the "availability for compulsory process," Melvin 
Memo, at 14. \ et, only ten of the 65 listed "former clients" coi lid be compelled to attei id a trial 
in Maryland because they presumably reside outside of Maryland.9 See Melvin Decl. f 9(c). 
Melvin makes no effor t to show that compulsory process would be necessary in any event. ' I o 
Specifically, the Court noted that although the defendant stated in his affidavit that he would call a number 
of Florida witnesses in support of his case, he offered nothing to indicate "the quality or materiality of the testimony 
of said witnesses;" he offered nothing to show that the witnesses would not voluntarily come to Oklahoma for trial, 
that deposition testimony would nor be sufficient, or that the use of compulsory process would be necessary. Id. 
The court further rejected the defendant's conclusory statement that "boxes of documents" would have to be 
produced in support of the defense because the defendant never explained why the documents could not be sifted 
through and the relevant documents shipped to Oklahoma. Id. at 966. 
9As the court put it in Greenberg v. Greenberg, 954 F. Supp. 213 (D. Colo. 1997) when faced with an 
identical claim by the defendant, "whether the trial is held in Colorado or Michigan, certain witnesses will not be 
subject to the subpoena power of the court and some witnesses and documents will have to be transported. Transfer 
of civil actions is not favored where the transfer would serve only to shift the burden of inconvenience from one 
party to another." Id at 217. 
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the contrary, Melvin states that these unidentified witnesses hold him in such "high regard" that 
then uoulilbf willnu1 to travel and testify mi his behalf Mv\ 'in Memo .it 16. 
Regarding the locus of evidence, Melvin claims that "[mjost of the sources of proof are in 
Maryland," but he provides no indication as to what that proof is and why it could not be 
presented in Utah.10 Without any analysis of the conflict of laws question, Melvin categorically 
states that "Maryalnd [sic] law will govern the issue of whether or not the defendant's employer 
explanation as to why this Court is not just as competent to examine a simple quantum meruit 
claim as a federal judge sitting in Maryland. 
Finally, Melvin has also overlooked another basic defect in his transfer argument. 
Witnesses will testify, depositions will be taken, and documentary evidence will be presented at 
trial- be it in 'fs Ian, land or I Itah only if there is a trial Fi anklin C D\ e> has filed a full) 
dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment which demonstrates unequivocally that Melvin's 
claims are frivolous. This Court is perfectly competent to rule on Franklin Covey's Summary 
Judgment Motion and nothing will be gained by transferring this case only to have the case 
delayed, unnecessary resources expended and then summarily dismissed in Maryland. This case 
has progressed far beyond the Maryland ^ ction. "While a sum n lary judgment motion is pending 
in this case, a responsive pleading is not due in the Maryland Action for another several weeks. 
10Melvin states that some files are electronic data files that could be accessed "from any computer with a 
modem." Melvin Decl. f 11. Hence, according to Melvin's own analysis, these files would be as readily accessible 
from Utah as from Maryland. 
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CONCLUSION 
Foi thf forey,oiii(L» reasons,, MHvin's Motion It) Dismiss tor 1 ack ol Personal Jurisdiction 
or in the Alternative to Change Venue should be denied. 
D/YIFDtlns, I Mi day of April, IW8 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar 
Candice Anderson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client 
Sales, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served in the 
method indicated below to the below named parties this 13th of April 1998. 
HAND DELIVERY 




812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Spring, MD 20901 




MarkL. Ht:shd, l-sq. 
Suite 307 
11501 Georgia Avenue 
Wheaton, MD 20902 
Doc. 5081 12 
Tab 6 
^ r ^ w / w U S T T
" ' ^ ^dlc:-! District 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar #5660 
Candice Anderson #7456 
370 East South Temple, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5678 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, ] 
INC., a Utah corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
v. ] 
DAVID MELVIN, an individual, ] 
Defendant. ) 
) REPLY MEMORANDUM 
) IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
I FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
| Civil No. 980901616 MI 
1 Judge David S. Young 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501(l)(c) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Plaintiff 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Franklin") respectfully submits this Reply Memorandum in 
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment in this Declaratory Judgment Action against David 
Melvin ("Melvin"). 
NQ MATERIAL F ACI& AREIN DISPUTE 
Franklin's principal memorandum sets out four undisputed facts which require this 
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as to whether Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. or Franklin Covey Co. was his employer, Melvin 
does not, and cannot, contest these four facts. Melvin's Opposition i\ lemorandun 1 '"places all of 
its eggs in one basket," hoping that an artificially created ambiguity about the identity of his 
employer may somehow create a genuine issue of material fact. Unfortunately for Melvin, the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure make a strawman of his desperate strategy. 
This Court is presented with a straightforward legal question: Can Melvin assert a claim 
Agreement forbids it? The answer to this question is the same whether Melvin was employed 
by Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. or Franklin Covey Co. Either way, there is only one 
employment relationship, one employer, one employee and one relevant agreement. Melvin's 
self-serving confusion fails to create a question of material fact because the Rules of Civil 
either for itself, or on behalf of its parent, Franklin Covey Co. Moreover, to the extent necessary 
(if at all), Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. has received an assignment from Franklin Covey Co. 
of any rights necessary to prosecute this action and Franklin Covey Co. has agreed to be bound 





I. MELVIN HAS FAILED TO CREATE A GENUINE ISSUE WITH RESPECT TO 
ANY MATERIAL FACT. 
A. Melvin's Confusion About the Identity of His Employer is Irrelevant Because 
This Action is Binding Against Both Franklin Covey Client Sales. Inc. and 
Franklin Covey Co. 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Franklin Covey Co. 
(formerly Franklin Quest Company). N tel/v in's act tial en iplo> er was Franklin Cove)- Client Sales, 
Inc. This fact is established by reference to Melvin's IRS form W-2 for tax year 1997. See 
Exhibit A. Melvin attempts to evade the substance of this action by asserting that Franklin 
Covey Co. was his employei and that Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc therefore lacks standing 
to enforce his compensation Agreement. Melvin's gamesmanship is useless for two reasons. 
First, , R ule 1 7 of the I Jtah Rules of Civil Pi ocedure expressly piin • ide s -.-. t) * ith 
whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another... may sue in that 
person's name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought." U.R.C.P. 17(a) 
(emphasis added). I litis, e v en if this action redou • »the benefit of Franklin Cm ey Co , 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. is permitted to sue in its own name without joining Franklin 
Co\ e> Co. 
Second, to the extent necessary (if at all) Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. has received 
an assignment from Franklin Covey Co of "any rights which may be necessary to entitle 
Plaintiff to prosecute this action as the real party-in-interest." See Exhibit B. Further, Franklin 




as Plaintiff...." Id. Thus, Rule 17fs purpose of ensuring that the "defendant will be permitted 
^ -cv i] iefenses or ecu u iterclain is a v ailable against 1:1 le real ow i ler of the cause" is clearly 
satisfied. Shaw v. Jeppson, 239 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1952). 
Most importantly, Melvin's technical gaming fails to evade an inescapable point: there 
was only one employment relationship, the terms of that relationship are established by an 
undisputed compensation Agreement, the rights of Franklin (whether Franklin Covey Co. or 
F ran klin Cov ey Client Sales, Inc ) and N leh in are established b> that \greement, a i ici Melvin is 
seeking to obtain quasi-contract recovery on a claim precluded by the Agreement. Melvin cannot 
avoid the judicial determination required by the undisputed facts by professing convenient 
confusion as to whether he was employed by the parent or the subsidiary. 
B. Mglvin Has Not Satisfied the Rule $$ Standard Tp Create Any Genuine Question 
of Material Fact. 
After exhausting its energy on the irrelevant entity issue, Melvin's Opposition 
Memorandum offers a few disconnected stabs at creating some question of fact. Melvin 
but not products. Yet, Melvin has admitted in his Maryland Complaint that Franklin's policy and 
practice was to not pay commissions "until Franklin actually delivered the product or service." 
Melvin's Md. Complaint, f 8, Exhibit A to Franklin's Principal Memo (emphasis added).1 
Melvin also seems to suggest that there is some additional agreement that may relate to his employment. 
Melvin's Opp. Memo. p. 5. Yet, Melvin has not attached or made part of the record any other agreement. Such an 
unsupported contention fails to satisfy the Rule 56(e) standard to create a genuine issue of material fact. U.R C.P. 
56(e) (a "party may not rest upon the mere allegations . . . of his pleadings , . . . " ) . 
. • ! 
"XAfr 
Melvin also contends that his termination may have been based on age discrimination and 
references the fact that he has filed «: si- *-•'-* - . • • i. \ \:i H % ^ p . 
hopelessly irrelevant. Age discrimination offers its own federal statutory remedy. If Melvin can 
prove age discrimination before the EEOC, his damages in that proceeding will include lost 
commissions, as allowed by his compensation Agreement. This action requires a 
determination of what the compensation Agreement allows. Melvin's claim that his 
*mploymei it wa s terminated because of his age is a complete^ unrelated proceeding and has no 
impact on whether the Agreement at issue in this suit bars Melvin's quantum meruit claim. 
As a final argument, Melvin invites the Court to inquire into potentially divergent 
understandings of the parties in order to determine the meaning of the compensation Agreement. 
This argument suffers immediate death from the fundamental rule that parol evidence cannot be 
1062 (Utah 1981) ("It is only when an ambiguity exists which cannot be reconciled by an 
objective and reasonable interpretation of the contract as a whole that resort may be had to the 
use of extrinsic evidence."). Melvin's compensation Agreement provides: "According to 
Franklin policy, commissions are paid only for those services delivered while you are 
employed by Franklin " This is not ambiguous.'" 
2Rule 56 requires Melvin to do more than "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings" in 
order to create a genuine issue of material fact. U.R.C.P. 56(e). Melvin has submitted only an inadmissible 




As a matter of law, Franklin is entitled to a declaration that it has no obligation to pay 
Melvin compensation or com missions for sales after the termination of his employment. 
Franklin therefore requests that the Court enter the declaratory relief requested in the Complaint. 
DATED this Y _ day of June 1998 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar 
Candice Anderson 
Attorneys For Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. 
6 
CERTIFICATE; OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be mailed, 
postage prepaid this ^^ day of June, 1998 to the following: 
Mark L. Hessel, Esq. 
Suite 307 
11501 Georgia Avenue 
Wheaton, MD 20902 
David Melvin 
812 Whittington Terrace 
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MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar #5660 
Candice Anderson #7456 
370 East South Temple, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5678 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, \ 




DAVID MELVIN, an individual, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) FRANKLIN COVEY CO. 
) CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY 
) JUDGMENT AND ASSIGNMENT 
i Civil No. 980901616 MI 
i Judge David S. Young 
Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Plaintiff*) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Franklin Covey Co. Defendant David Melvin ("Defendant") contends that Franklin Covey Co., 
rather than Plaintiff, was his employer and is thus the real party-in-interest in this action. 
Franklin Covey Co. hereby asserts that Plaintiff was, in fact, Defendant's employer during the 
relevant time period and that Plaintiff is the real party-in-interest in this action. Nevertheless, 
Franklin Covey Co. hereby consents to be bound by the Judgment entered in this action to the 
same extent as Plaintiff, including any counterclaims which may be asserted by Defendant. 
Further, Franklin Covey Co. hereby acknowledges an assignment to Plaintiff of any rights which 
may be necessary (if any) to entitle Plaintiff to prosecute this action as the real-party-in-interest. 
DATED this 3 _ day of June 1998. 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar 
Candice Anderson 
Attorneys For Franklin Covey Co. 
"jctt 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing FRANKLIN COVEY 
CO. CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY JUDGMENT AND ASSIGNMENT to be mailed, postage 
prepaid this 7 ^ day of June, 1998 to the following: 
Mark L. Hessel, Esq. 
Suite 307 
11501 Georgia Avenue 
Wheaton, MD 20902 
David Melvin 
812 Whittington Terrace 




MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar #5660 
Candice Anderson #7456 
370 East South Temple, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5678 
FILED 
J u i N j togg 
3rd OiS 
Third Judfewo£?rS?T 
i f 4 1998 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. 
t**itram~ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
DAVID MELVIN, an individual, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 980901616 MI 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendant David Melvin's Motion(s) to Dismiss and Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client 
Sales, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court on July 26,1998. Steven C. 
Bednar appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. and on behalf of 
Franklin Covey Co.1 Defendant David Melvin did not appear at the hearing. The Court 
Franklin Covey Co. is not a named party to this action but has previously filed a pleading entitled Consent 
to Be Bound By Judgment and Assignment. 
#6793 
im 
announced the rulings set forth in this Order based upon the Memoranda submitted by the parties 
and without oral argument. 
The Court, having read briefs and memoranda submitted by the parties and the 
accompanying attachments and having considered the relevant authorities, hereby orders as 
follows: Defendant's Motion(s) to Dismiss are hereby DENIED.2 With respect to Plaintiff 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, there are no genuine issues 
of material fact and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED. 
David Melvin 
2Defendant David Melvin filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Change Venue while this 
action was pending in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. Defendant also filed a Motion to 
Dismiss after remand to this Court. Both Motions assert a lack of personal jurisdiction which the Court finds 
unmeritorious. The Alterative Motion to Transfer Venue raised in Defendant's First Motion to Dismiss became 
moot upon remand. Other arguments raised in Defendant's Motion(s) to Dismiss are subsumed in this Court's 




MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar #5660 
Candice Anderson #7456 
370 East South Temple, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5678 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
) D E C L A R A T O R Y 
Plaintiff, ) J U D G M E N T 
v. ) 
DAVID MELVIN, an individual, ) Civil No. 980901616 MI 
Defendant. ) Judge David S. Young 
The Court hereby enters judgment in this Declaratory Judgment Action as follows: 
1. Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. is a "person interested" under the Utah 
Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq. Plaintiff is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Franklin Covey Co. Franklin Covey Co. has consented to be bound by the 
Judgment filed in this action to the same extent as Plaintiff. This Declaratory Judgment is 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 






therefore binding upon both Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. and Franklin Covey Co. 
(hereinafter "Franklin Covey.")1 
2. The Court hereby declares the rights, status, legal relations and obligations of 
Franklin Covey and Defendant Melvin arising from Defendant Melvin's employment with 
Franklin Covey as follows: (1) Franklin Covey has no contractual, implied or other obligation to 
pay Defendant Melvin commissions or any other compensation related to seminars held or future 
seminars scheduled to be held or products sold subsequent to the September 12, 1997 effective 
date of Defendant Melvin's separation from Franklin Covey; (2) the Release signed by Defendant 
Melvin on November 13,1997 bars all claims related to payment of compensation or 
commissions for services performed by Melvin during his employment with Franklin; and (3) 
Franklin's policy and practice with respect to the payment of commissions to separated Account 
Executives is not violative of law.2 
3. The parties shall each bear their own costs and attorneys' fees in this action. 
The Court acknowledges that Defendant Melvin contends that his actual employer was Franklin Covey 
Co. and not Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. However, the Court finds that it is immaterial whether Defendant 
Melvin was employed by Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. or Franklin Covey Co. This action concerns only one 
employee, one employer, and only one employment relationship. The relevant terms of Defendant Melvin's 
employment relationship are established by an undisputed compensation agreement under which the rights, status, 
and legal relations of the parties are hereby determined. 
2
 The Court finds that the declaratory relief furnished herein is required under both Utah and Maryland 
law. The Court is therefore not required to determine which law applies to this dispute. 
#6794 2 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
David Melvin 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
David Melvin, the appellant, notes his appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals in the above 
entitled matter granting of Declaratory Judgment in favor the appellant, Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. by the Third Judicial District Court In and For Salt Lake County on July 
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Civil Case No. 980901616MI 
Judge David S. Young 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER 
The pro se defendant, David Melvin, respectfully moves this Court for an Order to Modify and/or 
Amend its Declaratory Judgment Order signed July 27,1998 and the underlying Summary Judgment 
Order that supported it signed July 14,1998 pursuant to Rule 60 (b) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure (herein U.R.C.P.) and to vacate both Orders and for reasons states as follows: The Orders 
referred to in this motion were filed on July 14,1998 and July 27,1998 respectively This is motion is 
being filed on October , 1998 and is therefore timely pursuant to Rule 60 (b) U.R. C. P. 
1. Errors of Law. 
a. The Court's findings of fact are insufficient to support its conclusions of law. The 
declarations adjudged by the Court in the Declaratory Judgment Order are beyond the 
scope of the facts found by the Court in the Summary Judgment Order, are not supported 
by the record, and must be withdrawn. 
5 ^ 
b. The Court erred as a matter of law by extending its Order to the state of Maryland in that 
Maryland law was never briefed nor presented to the Court and the factual findings in the 
Summary Judgment Order do not support a finding that the Declaratory Judgment is 
"required under both Utah and Maryland law." 
C. The Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff, Franklin Covey Client 
Sales, Inc. (herein FCCS) did not have authority to sue as it was not the real party in 
interest as required by Rule 17 U.R.C. P. 
d. This Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because it failed to enforce Section 78-33-2 
requiring that the plaintiff be a party "interested" or affected by a written contract and 
Section of the Utah Code, and 78-33-11 of the Utah Code requiring that when declaratory 
relief be sought by all persons claiming any interest which would be affected by the 
declaration, and without said necessary party this Court's ruling will not end the 
controversy. 
e. The Court erred in failing to find that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendant before 
entering its judgment in this case. 
f. The Court erred in deciding the Summary Judgment motion prior to allowing the defendant 
time for discovery. 
g. The Court erred in not excluding the "Consent to be Bound By Judgment and Assignment," 
a document clearly lacking in probative value for which there exists no support in Utah 
practice or law and further erred by basing its Declaratory Judgment Order substantially 
upon this dubious document which was of questionable probative value but clearly highly 
prejudicial. 
h. The Court erred in the legal standard it applied to the document signed by the defendant on 
April 9,1998. 
SOI 
i. The Court erred in the legal standard it applied to the document signed by the defendant on 
November 13,1998. 
j . The Court erred by failing to address the defendant's unjust enrichment claim. 
2. Errors of Fact. 
a. The Court erred in entering a Declaratory Judgment Order that is unsupported by the 
Court's findings of fact in its Summary Judgment Order and is so lacking in support that it 
is against the weight of the evidence before the Court. 
b. The Court erred in finding that as a matter of law there were no uncontested material facts 
when genuine issues of fact existed on the record. 
c. The Court erred in finding there this action "concerns one employee, one employer and one 
employment relationship" as there are no facts in the record to support this conclusion. 
d. The Court erred in finding that the April 9,1998 document was "an undisputed 
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Judge David S. Young 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT OR ORDER 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501(l)(a) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Defendant, pro se, David 
Melvin respectfully submits this memorandum in support of his Motion for Relief from this Court's July 
14,1998 and July 27,1998 Orders. 
ERRORS OF LAW. 
In its Summary Judgment Order the Court found the following: "The Defendant's Motion(s) to 
Dismiss are hereby DENIED." (The only supporting item was a footnote in which the Court stated it 
found both Motion asserting lack of personal jurisdiction unmeritorious.) (emphasis added) and "There 
are no genuine issues of material fact and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." There 
were no further findings. Yet in its Declaratory Judgment Order the Court declared the following: "(1) 
Franklin Covey has no contractual, implied or other obligation to pay Defendant Meivin commissions or 
any other compensation related to seminars held or future seminars scheduled to be held or products 
sold subsequent to the September 12,1997 effective date of Defendant Melvin's separation from 
Stfo 
Franklin Covey; (2) the Release signed by Defendant Melvin on November 13,1997 bars all claims 
related to payment of compensation or commissions for services performed by Melvin during his 
employment with Franklin; and (3) Franklin's policy and practice with respect to the payment of 
commissions to separated Account Executives is not violative of law." In a footnote, the Court held 
found that the "declaratory relief herein is required under both Utah and Maryland law. The Court is 
therefore not required to determine which law applies to this dispute." While admittedly giving the 
plaintiff all the relief it could dream of and more, unfortunately, the Court failed to consider the record 
before it and whether or not its findings were support by it. In fact, the Court committed several errors 
of law. "Rule 60(b)(1) provides a trial court may relieve a party of a judgment in a case of . . . mistake 




1. The findings of fact set forth in the Summary Judgment Order are insufficient to support the 
declarations and relief granted in the Declaratory Judgment Order. "It has long been the law in this 
state that conclusions of law must be predicated upon and find support in the findings of fact." 
Gillmor v. Wright, 209 UAR 6,9 (Utah 1993) citing cases back to 1917. "Without adequate 
findings of fact, there can be no meaningful appellate review," Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 
551, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Willey v. Willey, 914 P.2d 1149,1151 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); 
Willey v. Willey, 333 UAR 8,10 (Utah, 1997) and an appellate court is forced to remand an action 
to the trial court (on occasion, several times) in order to obtain adequate findings to review. This is 
wasteful of judicial resources and places an unfair burden on the party forced to continually apply 
to the appellate courts for relief. "To allow the trial court to impose speculation on the adjudicatory 
process violates the basic premise upon our judicial system is founded. All parties are absolutely 
entitled to a fair and impartial hearing and adjudication of their affairs," Willey v. Willey, 287 
UAR 27,28 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) which was so clearly lacking in this case. 
2. Except for one Maryland case cited by the plaintiff in its original Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, which dealt with a general legal principle regarding contract 
interpretation, under a legal theory that was disputed by the defendant, neither side briefed nor 
presented any arguments to this Court citing Maryland law. While the Declaratory Judgment 
statement making this Court's Order applicable under Maryland law (and thus presumably 
attempting to foreclose future action in the Maryland courts), may demonstrate the value of Rule 
5(b)(2) U.R.C.P. to a prevailing party (particularly one in a sympathetic forum), this alone cannot 
possibly justify the overreaching that this declaration demonstrates. The defendant challenges the 
plaintiff to show to the Court and the defendant anything in the record before the Court which 
would have permitted the Court to legitimately make this declaration. 
1 
sxn 
3. The Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, should have dismissed this case 
pursuant to Rule 17 U.RC.P. which states, "every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real 
party in interest." In the instant case, the real party at interest was the company with whom the 
Defendant had an employment relationship and who owed the Defendant certain obligations and 
responsibilities, and whose name as evidenced by all of the documentation presented to this Court 
(which was multitudinous and will not be repeated here) was Franklin Covey Co. not FCCS. 
"Rule 17 seeks to protect the interests of judicial economy and fairness to parties in a 
litigation", (emphasis added). Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds, Inc., 200 UAR 65, 66 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992)1 It should be noted that the plaintiff, FCCS, chose both the forum and the parties. 
When its privity to the defendant and thus, its standing to sue were questioned, it originally 
attempted to ignore the issue by obfuscation2 and finally provided a document which is notable for 
its originality, but would likely fail in the purposes for which it was offered in most courts and 
jurisdictions. While Rule 17 does recognize some exceptions listed below in order to forestall 
further irrelevant arguments by the plaintiff, none are applicable in the instant case: 
a. Rule 17 defines those that fall within its scope to include: "a party with whom or in whose 
name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute 
[to] sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose bene fit that action is 
brought/9 The rule contemplates that the party bringing the suit has the capacity to sue on 
behalf of the real party in interest such as an executor, guardian, etc. Thus Rule 17 
1
 Anderson goes on to explain that the purpose of Rule 17 is to protect the defendant from multiple lawsuits 
on the same facts by several plaintiffs. While the plaintiff in the instant case could claim mat its spurious 
document entitled "Consent to be Bound" provides the defendant with this protection it really doesn't The 
clear intent of both Rule 17 and Anderson and other case cited herein is for the real parties in interest to the 
dispute to have their case brought forward on the merits and tried before an impartial firider of fact and law. 
The clear intent of the plaintiffs "Consent to be Bound" is to undermine that process, .ht best it provides 
protection solely for the plaintiff and (and the mysteriously absent Franklin Covey Co.) in the instant case, and 
none to the defendant At wont it protects neither party. Its validity and probative value are addressed in 
detail later in this document and will not be rehashed in this footnote. However, given lfr dubious merit as a 
pleading it is highly doubtful mat another Court in another jurisdiction would give it any consideration at all 
or either allow it into evidence. 
2




contemplates 3 party beneficiary suits when the plaintiff has privity with the contracting 
parties and was an intended beneficiary of any contracts alleged." American Towers 
Owners Assoc, Inc. v. C.C. Mechanical Inc., 306 UAR 3, 5 (Utah 1996). In addition to 
the lack of privity that exists between the Defendant and FCCS, a review of the April 9, 
1997 letter (which plaintiff so assiduously attaches to all its pleadings) clearly shows it 
was never mentioned. "The intent of the contracting parties to confer a separate and 
distinct benefit must be clear." American Towers at page 6. There is r^ o evidence before 
this Court that would permit it to determine that FCCS could act on behalf of Franklin 
Covey Co. In its reply memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, plaintiff cites this 
Court to only part of Rule 17, which it then proceeds to interpret in a completely novel 
way, while ignoring (and asking this Court to accept this sleight of hand) the clear wording 
of Rule 17, regarding when a court can properly recognize 3rd party beneficiary status, and 
the long line of case law that has interpreted Rule 17 and under which plaintiff's claim 
would be dismissed. See American Towers, supra; Estate of Martin Haro v. Haro, 254 
UAR 19,20 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, 854 P. 2d 527, 
537 (Utah 1993) and the long line of cases cited therein, 
b. In the normal course of events, this Court could now allow the plaintiff to amend its 
complaint to conform to the evidence before it as well as the requirements of Rule 17. 
However, this is prevented by Rule 15 U.R.C.P. as it would "prejudice the adverse party 
(the defendant herein) in maintaining his action or defense on the menu." See England v. 
Horbach, 318 UAR 14,17 (Utah 1997). Rule 15 permits "a party to amend his pleading 
as a matter of course . . .before a responsive pleading is served... or within 20 days after 
it is served." Those times have clearly passed. In all other cases Rule 15 provides that 
"leave of court or written consent of the adverse party" is required for amendment. As in 
Kleinhert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 214 UAR 43,45 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) the required 
3 
fe^Q 
necessary amendment has been within plaintiff's knowledge for a long period of time and 
the prejudice to the defendant, who has continually raised this issue in its pleadings, is 
without question. Therefore, the only action available to this Court is to deny any 
amendment to the plaintiff's complaint and dismiss the action for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Accord 19 Am Jur 2d § 2216. 
c. In a vain attempt to cure this obvious defect, the plaintiff has attempted in its pleadings to 
place the burden for its error on the defendant, by claiming it is the defendant's 
responsibility to join Franklin Covey Co. in a compulsory counterclaim action pursuant to 
Rule 13 of the U.R.C.P. However, this self serving argument (one more in a long line of 
such arguments advanced by the plaintiff) is merely an attempt to avoid the merits of this 
matter and keep the defendant from having his day in court. There is no question that 
plaintiff raced the defendant to the courthouse with the intent of circumventing defendant's 
Maryland action, and then to profit by its actions in front of a friendly forum through a 
variety of questionable tactics and pleadings. The defendant has never admitted nor 
accepted that this court has either personal jurisdiction over the defendant nor the subject 
matter jurisdiction. Invoking the compulsory counterclaim argument is another red 
herring3. "If the suit is brought by a party that does not have the capacity to sue on behalf 
of the real party in interest the suit is a nullity." (emphasis added) Haro at page 20. 
Therefore, the complaint should be dismissed. Without a complaint there "remains no 
cause of action to substitute parties,'9 Haro, supra; and such substitution is further 
precluded by Rule 15 U.R.C.P. and cases cited herein. 
3
 It should be noted that one defense not yet raised by the plaintiff but probably waiting in the wings is Rule 
17(d) U.R.GP. which permits that when two or more persons associated in business transact such business 
under a common name, they can sue and be sued by such common name. This defense is expressly 
prohibited by the terms of Rule 17(d) which expressly precludes corporations. See also, Herbertson v. Willow 
Creek, 264 UAR 14 (Utah Ct App. 1995) and Herbertson v. Willow Creek, 299 UAR 24 (Utah 1996). Defendant 
merely raises it to discourage plaintiff as it casts about for a life raft from trying this particular life raft and 
wasting additional court and party resources, time and energy. 
4 
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dismissed this action. 
6 In its response to plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, defendant raised the following 
affirmative defenses: (1) there was no express agreement between the parties; (2) the terms of the 
April 9, 1997 letter are ambiguous and thus do not preclude an unjust enrichment cause of action; 
(3) that defendant's consent to the April 9, 1997 agreement was produced by duress; (4) that there 
formed; (5) that the real parly in interest breached its impl ted, covenant of good of good faith and 
.fair dealing The trial Court in its meager Summary Judgment findings failed to address any ol 
these issues "Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine .issue of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Crowther v MOM er, 241 
I JAR .' ! •' 1 11 llali I il \\)\\ I W«J I Sinn1 I he I 'iwirl Lulu ill In nidi rss .inn ml I In. •.(• kgiliiiiyte issues 
.raised by 'the defendant in its findings, it is impossible to determine how 'these impacted the findings 
that "w ere made or if they were considered at all In its Opposition to Summary Judgment, the 
defendant had further" .argued to the Court that summary judgment was inappropriate at: that juncture 
because there were clear factual issues in controversy and that information developed through 
6
 The defendant questions how 'the Court: would know to be able to make this determination since it never 
impartially considered me facts and circumstances related to in personam jurisdiction. Iik?.ly, it was not 
necessary for the Court to look further because it then asked plaintiffs counsel to draft the final Order and 
plaintiffs counsel had no incentive other than to give this matter short shrift. It is hopcc that a more erudite 
reviewer might deign to at least consider the merits of the defendant's arguments and provide the defendant 
discc mining wha • • t> -; «lr 'of v mi in" 
determination .lm* ^.«at o^ui^ MIMUIU uiiam tui UK UK * ui> A-tn,. - »> *?on is made 
Opposing summan ni tn-un; >i iu , - . J I ^ . i i ^n im h*^  H«.J Keen conspletcd the court; should 
i + - i to//. 5 ; 2 P 2< I 
3 7 6 , 3 7 7 » * tah " ' " , *«• J/V * >;< - .-'- ' . ^ r I K ; K .U p a g e 11 d U P ). 
7. The errors and issues at tr ibutable to the "Consent to be Bound" document are so i iumni iniis iinid 
egregious 'that they are addressed in an accompany ing motion and memorandum and ai e 
incorporated by reference herein 
8. 111111"tl* i I< in ilt:111'inint," 11 i <11 1.1 iei e wui e i u i 1^ :11111111: 1 ssi11 's 111 111111 u 111<11 I! at; I I 1  1 e t ' 111111 11 nl 11 11, i;e111 II111j 
p la in t i f f s argument 'that the Apri l 9, 1997 letter of agreement was .an express contract: between the 
part ies which governed all rights and obligations. "I 'his conclusion fails as a mat ter of law, see 
Bailey-Allen Company, Inc v. Kurzet, 876 P 2d 421 (Utah,. 1994). The reasons include: 
a. The agreement is ambiguous in 'that it does not provide for remedies in 'the event o f a breach by 
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expressly stating that "it was the entire understanding of the parties," and could, not be changed except in 
writing. 
8
 The plaintiff has continuously attempted to characterize the defendant's unjust enrichment claim as a 
quantum meruit claim. Utah law recognizes 'unjust enrichment as a separate cause of action under quanturm 
meruit, but with specific requirements that are particularly applicable in this case. See Eatey, supra at page 19. 
While the defendant will not argue die merits in the instant motion, this issue is one that is ripe on appeal and 
its specific applicability to the .facts in this case are so compeling, the defendant re serves the right to argue its 
merits and likely outcomes to an appellate court. 
9 
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 r i mi 111 111 mi J 11111 s i i 1111 ni 111 it: 111 \ee nj 11 j j, tgc A V\ t: n ive recogni ita in at 
restitution is available "as a matter oi reason and justice from the acts and conduct of the parties 
.and the circumstances surrounding the transactions ... . and is impose - :. « -
 t i 
about justice." Jeff at page 6. Plaintiffs own pleadings agree thai onu ambiguity is showi* M. I 
evidence is not only necessary but required Accord, Interwest. "Where plaintiff has failed this 
provided to the Court regarding 'this issue was in u * .:cu i.i it 's supplemental :taicmen Jatcd 
^ p n *?'* >i : « . *V the defendant su- -», u .-. -i_ • ' '< w . ~ 
bcdc ,IKS *" ai Klin Covey * MHM i^t *n good faith ai,. »*• u*w »ui in- him u au M, . u- ~e 
knew ! r a^os ^nerr ^rankhn * oxe\ ( »i had fired employee *n *i »"d sc 'assumed 
i . i ^ 
would be led on to pi *:!,.i v as much revenue as :K> hie u * : ranknn i . v-e\ - o and ihea 
summarilv fired in bad faith before J mid collect v n .a / - e 
facts alone, defendant's unjust enrichment claim (which is a legal action for restitution, Bailey at 
page 19) cries out for restitution and the opportunity" to be heard in open court: by an impartial trier 
o aid plaintiff has pi esented nothing to this Court to suggest otherwise Iii fact FCCS has 
never claimed, .as it cannot, that Franklin Covey Co. received, no benefit from, the Defendant's 
work. In fact, it claims in its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss that it is in need of im\ J fa ii it ? 
relief because it is paying the defendant's commissions to others. 
ERRORS OF FACT. 
AII I! ml* I lit" f Nf r ofs \) I 11 it I a 11 c ged 11 u u 11 »i 11 w t; 11 mi t H " i u i n • 111 ni 1111 he 111 v ad u i p s thai hi \ \ i I >een 
provided to this Court: In each case sufficient undisputed evidence has been submitted to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact Kleinert supra at page 45. "The extrinsic evidence relied on bj the 
parties reinforces the conclusion that a genuine issue of" fact exists making summary judgment 
improper. Wilkrd Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 26? UAR 46 ,50 (Utah 1995). 
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Further for each of the items i-*+nci *-uit idik- . with the r-. , J
 a* ) 
U.R.C.P. ^//ew v : Prudentic? *Q0 UAR 8, 9 (Utah 1992 h h n, ^iK „ . ;.^ ..,u s,,.. ^ ^ 
UAR 3, 7 (Utah 1994) ri/wg Retherfordv. AT&T Communications, 201 UAR 21 (Utah 1992). 
\f 
WHEREFORE, for 'the reasons stated above, it is respectfully requested 'that this honorable court issue 
an Order granting the relief requested herein 
ciU: 
David Melvin 
812 Whittington Terrac. 
Silver Spring, Maryland 
(301) 593-3364 
Defendant, prose 
DATED this^day of October, 1998. 
11 Jfli 
Cei tiiicate ot'Sei i iic e 
I hereby certify that on October" 5, 1998, I served a copy of the foregoing Motion, For Relief 
From Judgment Or Order and accompanying Memorandum, on counsel for the plaintiff, Ste\ en Bednar, 
370 East South Temple, Suite J'l"!, '"mil I akc Ut>, Utah H'l i l l by first class mail, postage prepaid. 
(Xj£rn-- , 
David Melvin 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 
(301) 593-3364 
Defendant, pro se 
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David Melvin 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 
(301) 593-3364 FAX (301) 593-2987 
Defendant, pro se 
M L c . 
THIRD ClSTSIcr C':l.*!r, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
: _anklm Cove\ Ghent Sales, Inc. 
d Mt : 
Defendant. 
Civil Case No 980901616MI 
Judge David S. Young" 
The pro se defendant, David Melvin, respectfully moves 'this Court for an, Order to Modify and/oi 
Amend, its Declaratory Judgment Order signed Jul) 27 1,998 and the underl> ing Summary Judgment 
Order that suppor ted it signed Jul> 14, 1,998 pursuant to Rule 60 (b)(2) and, (3) of the Utah 'Rules of 
Civil Procedure ("herein U.R.C.P.) and to vacate both Orders, dismiss the above entitled cause of action, 
motion were filed, on July 14, 1,998 and July 27, 1,998 respectively, This is motion is being filed oi 
Octobt " * • . ' - - . ' - P. 
Newly Discovered Evidence 
a. >H'-'vlint art?ued vi^-rojidv anri frequents Kefon- thi-* ^ "* ^not : \ this Court's 
uojeci matter 
jurisdiction because *iv esse h*K* **u *r Might bv an imprope r pa r ty , F rank l in Cove^ 
( 'litiil SiiiN s Imi l i n n i iwtfn n < i i mum iiiii MINI siamhiif1 iiiidl pnnil in i r sp i i iM' iiii; 
1 
plaintiff filed a document entitled "Franklin Covey Co. Consent To Be Bound by Judgment 
and Assignment" (Attachment A). 
b. The document was signed bv counsel for the plaintiff. FCCS. The document was not 
signed under oath. Nor does it establish the basis upon which counsel for FCCS has the 
authority to bind Franklin Covey Co. 
c. This document also lacks any reference to statute or case law to assert that it is a proper 
pleading of which this Court should take notice. This is of particular note because a 
comparison of this document with every other document filed by the plaintiff shows that in 
every other case, the plaintiff carefully cites authority for whatever relief it prays from the 
Court. Also in filing this document counsel for FCCS violated Section 78-51-32 (1) and 
(2)oftheUtahCode. 
d. Nevertheless, based on this document of extremely dubious probative value, the Court saw 
fit to make the following finding in its Declaratory Judgment Order (which again was not 
supported by its findings in its Summary Judgment Order): "This actica concerns only one 
employee, one employer and one employment relationship." The Cour; noted that FCCS 
was a wholly owned subsidiary of Franklin Covey Co., but failed to note the significance 
of that fact, as will be discussed in the supporting Memorandum. 
e. Attachment B is a document entitled "Verified Answer of Franklin Covey Co." which was 
filed in the case of Thomas M. Bay v. Franklin Covey Co. in the Superior Court for the 
State of California, County of Orange. As the Court will note, Franklin Covey Co. is the 
defendant in the California case and Attachment B was signed under the pains and 
penalties of perjury by a Vice President of Franklin Covey Co. (not an attorney of a 
subsidiary). In fact, it was signed by the same individual, John Harding, who signed the 
defendant's April 9,1997 agreement with Franklin Covey Co. 
2 
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f. The Court will note that die Fourth Defense set forth in the Verified Complaint signed 
under the pains and penalties of perjury by Mr. Harding, Vice President of Franklin Covey 
Co. is the following: "[P]laintifFhas failed to name necessary and indispensable parties, 
including plaintiff's employer at the time of termination, Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.'9 
g. If the reasoning behind the Consent to Be Bound is accurate that a Consent to be Bound 
obviates the need for proper pleading and procedure, then it is questionable as to why 
defendant's Franklin Covey Co.'s counsel chose to plead the said defense, failure to join a 
necessary party, namely FCCS, as a defense and permitted his client to sign under the 
penalties of perjury. Either FCCS and Franklin Covey Co. are separate entities with 
separate rights and responsibilities which require that each be held to account before a 
court of law in its own right or they are some form of previously unknown unified 
corporate entity. FCCS and Franklin Covey Co. cannot have it one way in California and 
another in Utah. 
h. Alternatively this Court was in error when it failed to exclude the Consent to be Bound by 
Judgment and Assignment, a document entirely lacking in probative value but clearly 
highly prejudicial, for which there exists no support in Utah practice or law and further 
erred in basing its actions on this document including permitting this suit to go forward, 
ignoring the standing, privity and other subject matter jurisdiction arguments raised by the 
defendant, and granting Declaratory Judgment based upon this document. 
i. The only appropriate remedy at this junction is dismissal. 
2. Misrepresentation and Other Misconduct of an Adverse Party. 
a. Accompanying the instant Motion is a Motion for Sanctions in this matter. 
b. In addition to this matter, a case has been filed in Federal District Court in Maryland. In 
that case, FCCS, as defendant, was required to file a document entitled "Defendant's 
Disclosure of Corporate Affiliations and Financial Interests." In that document counsel for 
3 
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the plaintiff acknowledged that FCCS is a wholly owned subsidiary of Franklin Covey Co. 
and not a division. The case law regarding the rights and responsibilities of parents and 
subsidiaries as opposed to parents and divisions is clear and was provided to counsel for 
the plaintiff by the defendant. Counsel for the plaintiff chose to ignore the case law and 
other authorities brought to his attention and chose to deliberately proceed on a course of 
action, which seemed likely to meet with favor with this Court and therefore produce a 
positive result heedless of his responsibilities as an officer of the Court, 
c. Section 78-51 -26 of the Utah Code requires: "|T|t is the duty of an attorney and counselor: 
(3) to counsel and maintain no other action than that which appears to him legal and just;" 
and (4) to employ... such means only as are consistent with truth and never seek to 
mislead the judges by artifice or false statement of fact or law." Counsel for the plaintiff 
has failed in his duties to the Court under both of these provisions. Further, pursuant 78-
51 -31 of the Utah Code the defendant moves for damages. 
4 SVk 
David Melvin FILED 
812 Whittington Terrace THIRD DISTRICT CCl'RT 
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 ^ , . . 
(301) 593-3364 FAX (301) 593-2987 93 GCT "9 A.'. 1 i : I U 
Defendant,prose ...,-,,» ;-r-r>rD^7>'-|:T 
. - ! ' { U : . f. ;j -f-**,' ' ' ' " ~ ' ' 
~*-<L2X£D*— 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT prpijTY CLr.RK 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




Civil Case No. 980901616MI 
Judge David S. Young 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT OR ORDER 
1. Newly Discovered Evidence. For a motion based on newly discovered evidence "to succeed, a 
party must establish: (1) the existence of newly discovered evidence which is material and 
competent; (2) that by due diligence the evidence could not have been discovered and produced 
before trial; and (3) that the evidence is not merely cumulative or incidental bi;* is substantial 
enough that with the evidence there is a likelihood of a different result. " Prom vc Development 
Corp. v. Mattson, 322 UAR 35,37 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), citing Barson v. Efi. Squibb & Sons, 
Inc. Attachment A easily meets all 3 prongs of the Promax test. (1) It is clearly material and 
competent since it is relevant to the judgment in this case. The verified answer casts doubt on the 
"Consent to be Bound Document" which, for the most part, formed the basis for this Court's 
findings and judgment. See Promax at page 37. (2) Finding this document at a'l took an almost 
heroic effort on the part of ihQ pro se defendant. The defendant lives in Maiy.Vnd, the Bay case 
£*•} 
has been filed in California. The defendant is an individual, with a family to support and other 
obligations to meet and without the resources that a multi national corporation, like the plaintiff, can 
muster for intensive investigation. In determining due diligence these factors should weigh heavily. 
Certainly first discovering the existence of a lawsuit involving Franklin Covey Co. 3000 miles 
away from the defendant's home, and, second, obtaining the pleadings from an unknown court, all 
within a reasonably short period of time, should be cause for approbation for the defendant's 
dedication and diligence to his cause. The defendant and Mr. Bay are not kno\m to each other, 
perhaps they once nodded to each other across the room at some convention, bia that would likely 
be an overstatement of their connection. Mr. Bay served Franklin Covey Co. in a completely 
different capacity than the defendant and they live on opposite coasts. The proof of service shows 
that the Verified Complaint in Mr. Bay's case was not served upon counsel for Mr. Bay in 
California until June 26,1998, which was the same date that this Court held its hearing on FCCS' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The defendant learned of the lawsuit only at 12ater date and with 
great difficulty acquired the pleadings. The fact that this matter is being brought to the attention of 
this Court within the 90 days required by Rule 60 should be facially sufficient to demonstrate due 
diligence; (3) there can be no question that this document is not merely cumulat ve or incidental 
since it sinks the plaintiff, FCCS's only hope for establishing its right to sue as i real party in 
interest as required by Rule 17 U.RX.P. and as an "interested" party as required by Section 78-33-
2 of the Utah Code. It also sinks the plaintiff's contention that its failure to join Franklin Covey Co. 
pursuant to Section 78-33-11 of the Utah Code will not impact the effect of this Court's 
Declaratory Judgment Order. The only appropriate remedy at this juncture is dismissal. 
2. Lack of Probative Value. "When a corporation sues or is sued in its corporate name, the action 
is by or against the corporation itself as a legal entity." 19 Am Jur 2d §2173. 4A parent 
corporation is not necessarily a party to an action involving a subsidiary." 19 Am Jur 2d §2174. 
"Generally service of process on a subsidiary is not valid as service upon a parent corporation, nor 
2 S>4 
is service on the parent valid as to the subsidiary." 19 Am Jur 2d §2193. In other words, under 
general principles of corporate law, parents and subsidiaries are separate and distinct entities and 
cannot sue or be sued on behalf of each other except in very specialized circumstances. Utah law is 
in accord. 
a. "A corporation, be it parent or subsidiary, has its own legal identity and existence. 
Common ownership or control does not automatically destroy that separate identity. 
Although in appropriate cases equity may look through the corporate shell to its alter ego 
to prevent fraud or wrongdoing, the general rule still applies that corporations are separate 
legal entities bound by the obligations as well as the benefits." Institutional Laundry v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 706 P.2d 1066,1067 (Utah, 1985), citing Surgical Supply 
Center v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Dept. of Employment Security, 223 P. 2d 593, 
595 (Utah, 1950). Franklin Covey Co. and FCCS are separate legal enities, each bound by 
its own obligations and benefits. Therefore, it was totally inappropriate for FCCS to 
attempt to obtain judgment against the defendant on behalf of Franklin Covey Co. without 
joining Franklin Covey Co. Even more to the point, "[I]n this situation the consideration of 
justice, which so requires is simply that a controlling corporation, such is Omnico, should 
not be permitted to manage and operate a business from which it stands to gain whatever 
profit may be made, have the advantage of the efforts of those who ser vs i t and then use 
nomenclature of another corporation as a facade to insulate it from responsibility for 
paving for such services." (emphasis added) Chatterly v. Omnico, 4SJ P.2d 667, 670 
(Utah, 1971). While the relationship between the plaintiff and Frankli*; Covey Co., aside 
from the fact that the plaintiff is a wholly owned subsidiary, remains a mystery in terms of 
plaintiffs relationship with the defendant, if any, the fact remains that the Franklin Covey 
Co. operated a business which employed the defendant, had the advantage of the 
defendant's efforts on its behalf, and made money from his efforts. It i', a misuse of the 
3 5*5 
powers of this Court to ask it to sanction an attempt by FCCS and Franklin Covey Co. to 
evade Franklin Covey Co. 's legal responsibilities and obligations. "Th?re is no doubt 
about the correctness of the proposition urged by the defendant that a party should not be 
permitted to use corporations of similar names to engage in a now you see it, now you 
don't legerdemain and thus trick or cheat another." Centurion Corp. v. Fiberchem, Inc., 
562 P.2d 1252,1253 (Utah, 1977.) This exactly what the plaintiflF, FCCS, and its counsel 
has been attempted to do. By the artful use of the nomenclature "Franklin Covey''it has 
attempted to obscure the legal distinction between the separate legal entities FCCS and 
Franklin Covey Co. in order to evade Franklin Covey Co.'s responsibilities and deny the 
defendant his day in court. However, this "artful pleading" should not be sanctioned by 
this Court particularly in light of the fact that Franklin Covey Co. has :;ow admitted under 
oath through a lawful, clearly designated representative, that it and FCCS are separate 
companies, 
b. The only theory upon which the plaintiffs contention could possibly be permitted is if it 
had (and it has not) conditioned its "Consent to be Bound" on the theory of "alter ego." 
However, to prevail with such a theory requires a specific showing that: " (1) there must 
be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation 
and the individual no longer exist, viz., the corporation is, in fact, the aiter ego of one or a 
few individuals; and (2) the observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, 
promote injustice, or an inequitable result." {emphasis added) Schafir v. Harrigan, 245 
Utah Adv. Rep. 15,17 (Utah Ct. of App. 1994) citing Norman v. Murray First Thrift & 
Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979.) See also Diston v. Enviropak Medical Products, 
Inc., 261 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 25 (Utah Ct. of App. 1995) in which the court found that the 
defense of alter ego can also be applied between corporations as well as individuals and 
corporations. There has been no such showing as required by Schafir iti this case. The 
sole document filed by the plaintiff in this case to support an alter ego contention is of 
dubious evidentiary value at best and fails completely when compared to die verified 
California document. Under these circumstances at a minimum the summary judgment 
should be reversed since for all of the reasons stated in both this and the accompanying 
motions, and the case dismissed 
c. Finally, since this court has authority and indeed in light of recent facts, the obligation, to 
apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel in dismissing this case. In Lake Philgsas Service v. 
Valley Bank & Trust Co., 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 24,28 (Utah Ct. of App. 1993) citing 
CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., Ill P.2d 967 (Utah 1989), the court affirmed 
the three elements necessary for a successful equitable estoppel defence, which are; "(1)a 
statement, admission, act or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later 
asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the 
basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure to act; and (3) injury to the 
second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such 
statement, admission, act or failure to act." In this case the FCCS has clearly asserted one 
claim which is inconsistent with the later California claim - the later ciitim carrying greater 
evidentiary value; the defendant has acted reasonable in bringing this matter to the court at 
the first opportunity; and substantial injury result to the defendant were this Court to not to 
reverse its previous Orders, estop the plaintiff from seeking to amend us pleadings based 
on its own misconduct, thus dismissing the case with prejudice. 
3. Misrepresentation and Other Misconduct of an Adverse Party. 
a. "Under general principles of agency, an instrument, to be binding on ths corporation must 
be executed in such manner as to show it to be the corporation's act; otherwise it will bind 
the individual officer or agent." Therefore, the instrument entered into by the officer or 
agent "must be executed in such a manner as to show on its face that it was the intention. 
5 
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. . to bind the corporation and not the officer or agent individually." "Unless the intention 
to bind the corporation is manifest, the fact that the officer executing this instrument adds 
his official designation after his signature, is not sufficient to make the instrument binding 
upon the corporation; it is binding on the officer personally." 19 C. J.S. Section 591 Other 
than the designation "attorneys for Franklin Covey Co." there is nothing on the face of the 
pleading entitled "Consent to Be Bound," unlike the very specific verification in 
Attachment A, that allows a fact finder to determine that it is manifest that Franklin Covey 
Co. intended to be bound by this document and that designation alone is insufficient. 
Further, plaintiff's counsel violated Section 78-51-32(2) of the Utah Code in failing to file 
with the clerk or this Court any documentation of his authority. "When reviewing the 
validity of an affidavit made on behalf of a corporation a distinction is made between those 
affidavits made by mere corporate agents and those made by agents who are also corporate 
officers... The requisites are more stringent forjudging the sufficiency of affidavits 
executed on behalf of a corporation by an agent of the corporation who is not a corporate 
officer. For example, the personal knowledge of such an agent regarahg the facts to which 
he has sworn will generally not be presumed, and therefore, the specific 'means and 
sources' of his information should be shown." Utah Farm Credit Association v. Watts, 
757 P.2d 154,157 (Utah 1987). The Consent to be Bound in the instant case has even less 
validity than a sworn affidavit and certainly less than the California verified document, 
since it was not made pursuant to the pains and penalties of perjury. At a minimum it 
should be judged in light of the same requirements for documents that have higher 
probative value. In that light it fails miserably.1 
1
 It is interesting to note that plaintiffs counsel, who in all other pleadings has painstakingly detailed both 
statutory and case authorities for its pleadings, fails to do either in this pleading because lone exists. 
Interestingly, when the defendant erroneously entitled a motion, Motion for Reconsideration, plaintiffs 
counsel took him to task chastising him because such Motions are not specifically provided for in the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, even though there is case law to support such motions. See Watkiss & Campbell v. 
Foa&Son, 808 P.2d 1061,1064 (Utah 1991); Runnier v. OVell, 215 UAR 57, 58-9, (Utah Ct App. 1993). 
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b. Plaintiff's counsel violated Section 78-51-26(3) and (4) of the Utah Cede when he chose to 
create and then submit the "Consent to be Bound" At the time, plaintiff's counsel well 
knew that two separate companies existed and that his case would fail were he to admit 
that fact. Instead, to prevent that from happening, and in order to preserve his advantage in 
the race to the courthouse, he chose to create a document which was misleading, lacking in 
probative value, irrelevant in terms of creating the necessary standing tor subject matter 
jurisdiction and highly prejudicial. The intention was clearly to undermine the 
requirements for subject matter jurisdiction required under Utah law. But, presumably the 
hope was that a local Court would provide greater leniency for such a pleading and 
plaintiff a counsel hope seems to have been justified. This Court chose to grant a Summary 
Judgment Order and an overly broad Declaratory Judgment Order relying entirely upon 
plaintiff's counsel's invalid pleading. Therefore, it is incumbent upon this Court not only 
to dismiss this matter with prejudice for the reasons cited herein and in the accompanying 
motions and memorandum, but also to take appropriate action pursuant to Section 78-51-
31 of the Utah Code against plaintiff's counsel. The defendant request.; damages and any 
other appropriate sanctions. 
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CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated above, it is respectfully requested that this honorable court issue 
an Order granting the relief requested herein. 
DATED tfaisO day of October, 1998. (JU~ 
David Melvin 
812 Whittington Terrace 




Certificate of Service 
*fc 
I hereby certify that on October Q, 1998,1 served a copy of die foregoing Motion For Relief 
From Judgment Or Order and accompanying Memorandum on counsel for the plaintiff, Steven Bednar, 
370 East South Temple, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 by Federal Express. 
David Melvin 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 
(301)593-3364 
Defendant, pro se 
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ATTACHMENT A 
r .- . r — . 
r- ) 
Clark Waddoups (CBN58546) l ^ 7 3 ? ^ , 
Robert S. Clark (CBN93634) ~/-*-C* ., 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801)532-7840 
Attorneys for Defendant Franklin Covey Co. — 
SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF ORANGE 
THOMAS M. BAY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANKLIN COVEY CO., a Utah 
corporation; NUCI THOMPSON, 
a California resident; and DOES 1 
through 50, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. 793884 
VERIFIED ANSWER OF 
FRANKLIN COVEY CO. 
Judge Richard O. Frazee Sr. 
Depc. 25 
Defendant Franklin Covey Co. ("Franklin Covey") answers as follows Plaintiff's 
Verified Complaint dated April 28, 1998: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Verified Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Franklin Covey responds as follows to the allegations contained in the following-
indicated paragraphs of the Verified Complaint: 
1. For lack of knowledge or information sufficient -to form a belief as to the 
truth thereof, denies. 
2. Admits that Franklin Covey is a corporation existing under the laws of die 
Scate of Utah. Upon information and belief, denies the remaining allegations. 
3. Upon information and belief, denies. 






























5. Because none of the allegations in this paragraph are directed at Franklin 
Covey no answer is required. To the extent, however, that any of the allegations in this 
paragraph are directed at Franklin Covey, the same are denied. 
[Facts] 
6. Admits that Bay was employed by-Franklin International Institute, Inc., 
and its successors, and that Bay conducted and spoke at seminars scheduled by the 
company. Denies the remaining allegations. 
7. Admits that Bay's employment was terminated. Admits that on or about 
November 18, 1997, John R. Harding sent Bay a letter concerning such termination. 
Franklin Covey alleges that the letter speaks for itself. Denies the remaining allegations. 
8. Denies. 
9. Denies. 
[First Cause of Action] 
10. Franklin Covey hereby incorporates the foregoing responses to the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 9 of the Verified Complaint. 
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1 13. Admits that Bay's employment was terminated. Franklin Covey 
2 affirmatively alleges that such termination was proper and lawful. Denies the remaining 
3 allegations. 
4 14. Denies. 
5 15. Denies. 
6 [Second Cause of Action] 
7 1 16. Franklin Covey hereby incorporates the foregoing responses to the 
8 allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 15 of the Verified Complaint. 














23 |j 19. Denies. 
24 I 20. Denies. 
25 II [Third Cause of Action] 
26 I 21. Franklin Covey hereby incorporates the foregoing responses to the 















































(DENIAL OF ALLEGATIONS NOT SPECIFICALLY ADMITTED) 
28. Franklin Covey denies each and every allegation contained in the Verified 
Complaint that is not specifically admitted herein. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
(FAILURE TO JOIN NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTES) 
29. Plaintiff has failed to name necessary and indispensable parties, including 
plaintiffs employer at the time of his termination, Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
(TRUTH) 




31. Some or all of the statements of which plaintiff complains arc not provably 
false statements of fact, but rather constitute protected expressions of opinion and 
therefore are not actionable 
-4-




32. Plaintiff is a public figure and no statement about which he may be heard 
to complain was published with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the 
truth, and therefore is privileged. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
(PRIVILEGE - CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(c)) 
33. Some or all of the statements of which plaintiff complains are privileged 
pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c). 
NINTH DEFENSE 
(INCREMENTAL HARM DOCTRINE) 
34. Some or all of the statements of which plaintiff complains are not actionable 
under the incremental harm doctrine. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
(U.S. CONST. AMENDS. 1 AND 14) 
35. Plaintiffs defamation claims are barred by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
(ACTS AND OMISSIONS OF PLAINTIFF) 
36. Plaintiffs own acts and omissions directly caused or directly contributed to 
any damages he claims to have sustained. 
TWELFTH DEFENSE 
(ACTS OF THIRD PARTIES/INDEPENDENT INTERVENING CASES) 
37. Some or all of the damages to which plaintiff complains were the result of the 
fault and/or the actions of third parties over whom Franklin Covey had no control and/or 
were the result of independent intervening causes. 
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE 
(ESTOPPELAVAIVERyLACHES) 
38. Some or all of plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrines of estoppel, 
waiver and/or laches. 
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(ECONOMIC LOSS RULE) 
39. Some or ail of plaintiff's claims are barred by the economic loss rule. 
FIFTEENTH DEFENSE 
(FAILURE TO MITIGATE) 
40. Plaintiff has failed to mitigate the damages he claims to have sustained. 
SIXTEENTH DEFENSE 
(GOOD FAITH) 
41. Employer acted fairly and in good faith in terminating plaintiff's employment. 
SEVENTEENTH DEFENSE 
(WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT) 
42. The causes of action set forth in Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint are barred, in 
whole or in part, by the Workers Compensation Act. 
EIGHTEENTH DEFENSE 
(AT-WILL EMPLOYEE) 
43. Plaintiff was employed as an at-will employee. 
NINETEENTH DEFENSE 
(EXPRESS WRITTEN AGREEMENT OF TERMINATION AT-WILL) 
44. Plaintiff was employed under an express, written agreement by which he 
expressly agreed that his employment was terminable at-will. 
Wherefore, defendant Franklin Covey Co. demands that plaintiffs Verified 
Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and upon its merits, and that it be awarded its costs, 
expenses, and attorneys fees, and for such other and further relief as the Coun deems 
appropriate. * 
DATED this^^afay of June 1998. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Waddoups 
Robert S. Clark 
































STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE 
I have read the foregoing VERIFIED ANSWER OF FRANKLIN COVEY CO. 
[ j I am a party to this action. The matters stated in the foregoing document are 
true and of my own personal knowledge except as to those matters which are stated 
on information and belief, and as to those matters I believe them to be true. 
[x] I am an Officer [ J a partner [y\ a Vice President of 
Franklin Covey Co., a parry to this action and am authorized to make this 
verification for and on its behalf, and I make this verification for that reason. [ ] I 
am informed and believe and on that ground allege that the matters stated in the 
foregoing document are true. [X] The matters stated in the foregoing document are 
true of my own knowledge except as to those matters which are stated on information 
and belief, and as to those matters I believe them to be true. 
[ ] I am one of the attorneys for , a 
party to this action. Such party is absent from the county of aforesaid where such 
attorneys have their offices, and I make this verification on behalf of that party for 
that reason. I am informed and believe and on that ground allege that die matters 
stated in the foregoing document are true. 
Executed on ZO** TH , 1998 at Salt Lake City, Utah. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the 
foregoing is true and correct. 
John j(/ Harding 
[lUAkhnWuniuin.JitXk.uiil 
Sit 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
: ss. 
QvfrrrU 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this ^ U day of 
, 1998, by . 
X R T P U B L I C 
Residine at: 
AfrC./f AJJ>, Af~J 






























PROOF OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, declare and say: 
1. I am employed with the law firm of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee &. Loveless, 
whose address is 185 South State Street, Suite 1300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; 1 am not 
a party to the cause; and I am over the age of eighteen years. 
2. On the date hereof, I caused to be personally served the attached: 
VERIFIED ANSWER OF FRANKLIN COVEY CO. 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed as shown below, and 
then sealing and depositing that envelope in a designated and regularly maintained Federal 
Express location, with servicejjr delivery fees prepaid or provided tor, at Salt Lake City, 
Utah, for delivery on theOG>Hiav of June 1998. 
Attornevs for Plaintiff Randall S. Waier, Esq. 
One Newport Place 
1303 Dove Street, Suite 760 
Newport Beach, California 92660 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the 
above is true and correct. 







MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C.Bednar #5660 
Candice Anderson #7456 
370 East South Temple, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5678 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, 





DAVID MELVTN, an individual, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) FRANKLIN COVEY CO. 
) CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY 
) JUDGMENT AND ASSIGNMENT 
i Civil No. 980901616 MI 
i Judge David S. Young 
Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Plaintiff) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Franklin Covey Co. Defendant David Melvin ("Defendant") contends that Franklin Covey Co., 
rather than Plaintiff, was his employer and is thus the real party-in-interest in this action. 
Franklin Covey Co. hereby asserts that Plaintiff was, in fact, Defendant's employer during the 
relevant time period and that Plaintiff is the real party-in-interest in this action. Nevertheless, 
Franklin Covey Co. hereby consents to be bound by the Judgment entered in this action to the 
same extent as Plaintiff, including any counterclaims which may be asserted by Defendant. 
Further, Franklin Covey Co; hereby acknowledges an assignment to Plaintiff of any rights which 
may be necessary (if any) to entitle Plaintiff to prosecute this action as the real-party-in-interest. 
DATED this 9 day of June 1998. 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar 
Candice Anderson 
Attorneys For Franklin Covey Co. 
5M^ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing FRANKLIN COVEY 
CO. CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY JUDGMENT AND ASSIGNMENT to be mailed, postage 
prepaid this tf** day of June, 1998 to the following: 
Mark L. Hessel, Esq. 
Suite 307 
11501 Georgia Avenue 
Wheaton, MD 20902 
David Melvin 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 
5 ^ \/ 
ATTACHMENT C 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 





FRANKLIN COVEY CO., ET AL., 
Defendants. 
Civil Action Number: AW 98-655 
DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE 
AFFILIATIONS AND FINANCIAL INTERESTS 
Pursuant to Local Rule 103(3), Defendants Franklin Covey Co. ("Franklin Covey") and 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("FCCS") (collectively "Defendants"), attached hereto as 
Exhibit A is a listing of all of the subsidiaries of Franklin Covey and FCCS. None of (he 
other affiliated companies is a party and none has a financial interest in the outcome of the 
litigation. 
Steven C. Bednar 
Candice Anderson 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & 
BEDNAR, LLC 
370 E. South Temple, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5678 
Lead Counsel for Defendants Franklin Covey 
Co. and Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. 
By: Q^l /fJCJZ^ 
Brian NuterangeJo (Bar No. 13801) 
Samuel Walker (Bar No. 12304) 
WILEY, REIN & FIELDING 
1776 K Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC. 20006 
Telephone: (202)429-7000 
Co-counsel for Defendants Franklin 
Covey Co. and Franklin Covey Client 
Sales, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERYICE 
I hereby certify that 1 caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' 
DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND FINANCIAL INTERESTS to be 
hand-deiivered this v"* day of May, 1998 to the following: 
Mark L. HesseJ, Esq. 
Suite 307 
11501 Georgia Avenue 
Whcaton, MD 20902 
Brian Nuterangelo 
FRANKUN Covey CO. 
Whrilr-Qvrncd flwtofliirica 
Franklin Development Corporation U Utah corporation) 
Franklin Covey Europe* Inc. (a Utah corporation) 
Franklin Covey Canada, Ltd. (an Ontario corporation) 
Knmkiiti tLxcdlaicCt Ioc« (a Utah corporation) 
Franklin International Alia, Inc. (a Utah corporation) 
Franklin Covey Australia, Inc (a Utah corporation) 
Franklin Covey NZ* Inc (a Utah corporation) 
Franklin Covey Mexico, Iuc (a Utah corporation) 
Franklin Covey Taiwan, Inc. (a Utah corporation) 
Franklin Covey Argentina, Inc. (a Utah ootporatiou) 
Franklin Covey Brazil, Inc. (a Utah corporation) 
Franklin Covey Spain* Inc (a Utah corporation) 
Franklin Covey Puerto Rico, Inc (a Puerto Rico corporation) * 
Franklin Covey SA, Inc (a Utah corporation) 
Franklin Covey ASC, Inc (a Utah corporation} 
Publisher* Preis, Inc (a Utah corporation) 
Franklin Covey Client Sakv Inc (a Utah coiporatioo) 
Franklin Covey Catalog Sales, Inc. (a Utah evaporation) 
Franklin Covey Product &riej, Inc. (a Utah corporation) 
Franklin Covey Servku, L L C (a Utah limited liability company) 
Fnuikliti Covey Marketing Ltd. (a Utah limited pajtjicrahip) 
Franklin Covey Travel, Inc. (a Utah corporation) 
, Check Advantage Plus, Inc (a Utah corporation) 
Premier Agendas, Inc (a Wajhinpou corporation) 
Premier School Agenda*, Lid. (a British Columbia corporation) 
Premier Grephici, LP. (a Waihinttou limited partnerslup) 
l?ivttk)fl| 
Franklin Covey Consulting Croup (formeriy Shipley Ajjociaxea) 
Franklin Covey Lurimte of Fitncaj (formerly National hutirutc of Fitness (NIF7) 
Time Systems (TSD 
Productivity Plus fPPD 
Sporu Careen Diviiioa (formerly Stratford American Sporti Corp) 
Personal Coechinf Divbkm (formeriy TrucNorih Corporation) 
Software Solution* Division (formeriy Crephie Computer Solutions, Inc) 
Tab 12 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar, #5660 
James L. Barnett, #7462 
370 East South Temple, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5678 
Attorneys for Plaintiff t<^ 
:
* & 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
DAVID MELVTN, an individual, 
Defendant. 
FRANKLIN COVEY'S MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO MELVIN'S 
MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT OR ORDER 
Civil No. 980901616MI 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendant David Melvin ("Melvin") has filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment or 
Order under Rule 60(b)(1) and a separate Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order under Rules 
60(b)(1) and (2) (Melvin's "Motions"). Plaintiff, Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Franklin 
Covey"), by and through its counsel of record and pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Melvin's Motions. Rather 
than file separate Memoranda, Franklin Covey addresses both of Melvin's Motions and his 




Melvin was a Franklin Covey salesman. He had an express employment agreement which 
stated: "According to Franklin policy, commissions are paid only for those services delivered 
while you are employed by Franklin." Through counsel, Melvin threatened suit under quantum 
meruit for commissions on sales which occurred after his termination. Franklin Covey sought 
and received a declaration that Melvinfs express employment agreement precluded his claim. En 
route to obtaining declaratory relief, Franklin Covey and the Court waded through a constant 
flow of procedural and jurisdictional bickering from Melvin on topics such as removal, personal 
jurisdiction and standing. 
Melvinfs Rule 60(b) Motions ask the Court to revisit virtually all of Melvin's previously 
unsuccessful tactics and arguments and reach a different result. Melvin claims newly discovered 
evidence "sinks" Franklin Covey's position. This newly discovered evidence is an Answer to a 
Complaint filed in California against Franklin Covey Co., in which it is asserted that Franklin 
Covey Client Sales, Inc. was the plaintiffs actual employer (which is identical to the assertion 
made by Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. and Franklin Covey Co. in this action). This "newly 
discovered" evidence is consistent with and supports Franklin Covey's position and this Court's 
determination. 
Professing confusion as to the identity of his employer, Franklin Covey Co., as a non-
party, filed a pleading entitled Consent to be Bound by Judgment and Assignment. This 
pleading advised the Court that Franklin Covey Co. agreed to be bound by any judgment in the 
action to the same extent as its wholly-owned subsidiary, who was Melvin's actual employer, and 
also informed the Court that Franklin Covey Co. had assigned any rights necessary (if any) to 
G:\fTaI9023\l00mclvin\OppM.Reliefwpd U 
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allow Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. to prosecute the action as the real party in interest. 
Melvin has taken violent offense at this document. Melvin alleges the pleading is a fraud and 
asserts the Franklin Covey's counsel lacked authority to submit the pleading. Melvin's virulent 
response to the pleading seems to stem from the fact that he mistakes the document as an 
insufficient attempt to effect an assignment, rather than merely providing notice to the Court that 
the assignment occurred. Melvin's tantrum is irrelevant and misguided for three reasons: (1) the 
identity of his employer is irrelevant to the outcome because his employment relationship is 
governed by an undisputed agreement; (2) the Court was presented with Melvin's W-2 
establishing that his employer was Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc., and (3) Melvin was 
provided with a copy of the actual assignment executed by the President of Franklin Covey Co. 
and the Vice President of Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. Melvin's Rule 60(b) Motions are 
frivolous and should be denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On July 14,1998, this Court entered its Order denying Melvin's Motions to 
Dismiss and granting Franklin Covey's Motion for Summary Judgment. A copy of the Order is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
2. On July 27, 1998, this Court entered Declaratory Judgment in favor of Franklin 
Covey. A copy of the Declaratory Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit B. The Declaratory 
Judgment determined that: (1) Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Franklin Covey Co., is a "person interested" under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1, et seq.\ and (2) 
Franklin Covey has no obligation to pay Melvin commissions or any other compensation for 
sales which occurred after his termination from employment. See Exhibit B. 
G:\fral9023\100mclvin\Opp.M.Rcliefwpd HI 
ARGUMENT 
The pro se defendant's1 Motions for Relief from Judgment or Order improperly seeks an 
opportunity to relitigate virtually every issue previously decided against Melvin. Melvinfs asks 
for an opportunity to relitigate based upon "newly discovered evidence" which is merely 
cumulative and confirms the propriety of the Court's prior rulings.2 
Having failed to perfect a timely appeal of this Court's decision, Melvin now files Rule 
60(b) Motions encompassing the entire case. Melvin's purpose is clear: he now asks the trial 
court to function as its own court of appeals; and, upon denial of his Rule 60(b) Motions will file 
a new appeal hoping to regain the already lost appellate jurisdiction of the entire case through his 
denied motions, which have been incorrectly characterized as Rule 60(b) Motions. As explained 
by Wright & Miller, "Rule 60 is not a substitute for appeal." Wright, Miller & Kane, 11 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil Second § 2851 at 230 (1995) (emphasis added). Moreover, 
it is a "perversion of the rule and its purpose to permit it to be used to circumvent another rule" 
and should not be used to artificially extend a party's time to appeal. Id. § 2858 at 276; see also, 
Mr. Melvin has repeatedly called attention to his status as *pro se defendant and asks this Court for 
special treatment. See, e.g., Melvin's Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment at ^ f 4. However, it is unclear 
whether Mr. Melvin has been, or will be, proceeding pro se. On June 19, 1998, Melvin's wife, Marsha Melvin, 
submitted a declaration twice stating that David Melvin was proceeding pro se, but making repeated references to 
her participation in preparing pleadings. Several months later, on September 10, 1998, Franklin Covey received a 
communication from Melvin's wife, who then identified herself as Marsha Ostrer. Ms. Ostrer advised that she 
was an attorney (and former federal prosecutor) and that she was now representing Mr. Melvin in this action. 
A copy Ms. Ostrer's confirmation letter is attached as Exhibit C. On October 6, 1998, Franklin Covey received a 
second letter from Ms. Ostrer corn%ming her intention to apply pro hac vice but indicating that "Mr. Melvin will be 
proceeding pro se for the present. Since I do not formally represent him, I cannot speak on his behalf." (Emphasis 
added). In closing, Ms. Ostrer informally stated: "[a] communication from Mr. Melvin to you, along with additional 
items [five motions and memoranda] are enclosed." A copy of Ms. Ostrer's October 6th letter is also included at 
Exhibit C. 
2
 Both of Melvin's Rule 60(b) Motions ask this Court to modify and/or amend its prior rulings. To the 
extent Melvin seeks this relief, this Court may dismiss these Motions as untimely Rule 59 motions as they were not 
filed within ten days after entry of judgment Utah R. Civ. P. 59(c). 
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Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 P.2d 843 (1970) (refusing to allow Rule 60 motion to 
extend time for appeal); Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 288 P.2d 845 (1955) (same). 
This Court should refuse to allow Melvin's attempted end-run around the rules of appellate 
procedure. 
Rule 60(b)(1) countenances a motion for relief from judgment based upon a "mistake," 
such as an incorrect calculation or an erroneous description of property. However, courts are in 
near unanimous agreement that an appeal is the appropriate remedy where a party claims a 
misconception of law by the trial court. Wright & Miller § 2858 at 293-98. Here, Melvin asks 
this Court to revisit almost every issue without identifying any "mistake" other than his 
disagreement with the Court's conclusions. For example, Melvin attempts to resurrect his two 
motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Melvin's 60(b)(1) Memorandum at f 5. 
Based upon the pleadings, this Court found that Melvin's motions were unmeritorious. See 
Exhibit A. In making this determination, the Court was apprized of the fact that Melvin made at 
least ten trips to Utah related to his employment and that he alleged in his complaint filed in 
Maryland federal court that Franklin Covey owed him commissions specifically arising out of 
his efforts in Utah to solicit a major new customer.3 Melvin fails to explain how this Court's 
conclusion was a "mistake" and instead merely rehashes his prior argument. Melvin's 60(b)(1) 
Memorandum at f 5. 
Further, Melvin complains that this Court erred in finding that the same result is required 
under both Utah and Maryland law because "Maryland law was never briefed nor presented to 
3
 See Franklin Covey's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal 
Jurisdiction or to Change Venue at 1-4. 
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the Court." Melvin's 60(b)(1) Motion at f 1(b). In fact, Franklin Covey briefed this issue and 
presented the Court with Maryland case law which Melvin ignored.4 Moreover, Melvin 
completely fails to explain why this Court's ruling was wrong. Melvin's 60(b)(1) Memorandum 
at 1. "[RJelief will not be granted under Rule 60(b)(1) merely because a party is unhappy with 
the judgment. Instead, the party must make some showing of why he was justified in failing to 
avoid mistake or inadvertence." Wright & Miller § 2858 at 276-77. Melvin's mere repetition of 
his defeated arguments is not enough. 
Melvin's primary complaint is this Court's determination that Franklin Covey is a "person 
interested," and thus had standing to prosecute this declaratory judgment action. Melvin claims 
to have found "newly discovered evidence" that "sinks the plaintiff, [Franklin Covey Client Sales 
Inc.'s] only hope for establishing its right to sue as a real party in interest." Melvin's 60(b)(2) and 
(3) Memorandum at % 1. Moreover, Melvin claims that Franklin Covey has played a "now you 
see it, now you don't" shell-game in order to "insulate it from responsibility." Id. at f 2(a). 
Notwithstanding Melvin's climatic build-up, there is no smoking gun. In fact, Melvin's 
"newly discovered evidence" consists of an Answer to a Complaint filed in California against 
Franklin Covey Co. by a former employee. In that pleading, Franklin Covey Co. asserts failure 
to join an indispensable party as an affirmative defense because, just as in this case, the actual 
employer was Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.5 If this pleading were a smoking gun, it would 
4
 See Franklin Covey's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 5-6; Defendant's 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-9. 
5
 See Melvin's 60(b)(2) and (3) Memorandum at Exhibit A (Verified Complaint at f 29) stating "Plaintiff 
has failed to name necessary and indispensable parties, including plaintiffs employer at the time of his termination, 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc." For examples showing this is consistent with plaintiffs position here see 
Complaint at % 1; Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2; Franklin Covey Co.'s 
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be Melvin, not Franklin Covey, who would be caught red-handed. Instead, this pleading is 
merely cumulative. See Putvin v. Thompson, 878 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Utah App. 1994) (merely 
cumulative, newly discovered evidence is insufficient); Joseph v. TerminixInt'l Co., 17 F.3d 
1282, 1285 (10th Cir. 1994) (same). Melvin has repeatedly professed confusion about the 
identity of his employer,6 yet this "newly discovered evidence" strongly supports this Court's 
conclusion that plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. is the real party in interest. 
Melvin has taken violent offense at Franklin Covey Co.'s Consent to be Bound by 
Judgment and Assignment. Based on a mistaken belief that this pleading somehow immunizes 
Franklin Covey from liability, Melvin alleges the pleading is a fraud and asserts that Franklin 
Covey's counsel lacked authority to submit the pleading. Melvin's virulent response to the 
pleading seems to stem from the fact that he mistakes the document as an insufficient attempt to 
effect an assignment, rather than merely providing notice to the Court that the assignment 
occurred.7 Melvin fails to recognize that the pleading affords him two sources from which to 
Consent to be Bound by Judgment and Assignment at 1-2; Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Defendant's 
Second Motion to Dismiss at 2 n. 1; Franklin Covey's Memorandum in Opposition to Melvin's Motion for Sanctions 
at 3-4; see also Melvin's 1997 W-2 from Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc., a copy of which is attached as Exhibit D 
(originally provided to the Court as Exhibit A of Franklin Covey's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment). 
6
 Melvin has raised this issue no less than 11 times. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Change Venue at 1-2; Defendant's Response to Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction or to Change Venue at 1-2, 6-7; Defendant's 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-7; Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss [Melvin's Second Motion to Dismiss] at 1-2; Melvin's Motion to Continue Hearing Date at 3; Defendant's 
Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's Second Motion to Dismiss at 1-4; Defendant's Objections to 
Plaintiffs Proposed Order (dated July 15, 1998 and July 23, 1998) at ffl[ 1-3; Motion for Extension of Time (dated 
July 23, 1998) at % 1; Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Sanctions at fl 1-4. 
7Despite Melvin's professed confusion, it is obvious that the Consent was a pleading, not the actual 
assignment. The Consent itself explains that "Franklin Covey Co. hereby acknowledges an assignment to Plaintiff 
of any rights which may be necessary (if any) to entitle Plaintiff to prosecute this action as the real-party-in-
interest." Exhibit E at 2 (emphasis added). The actual assignment was executed by Franklin Covey Co.'s President 
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satisfy any entitlement he may establish, and is therefore to his benefit. Franklin Covey Co., as a 
parent corporation, certainly had no obligation to agree to be bound by a judgment against its 
subsidiary, Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. Moreover, Melvin's tantrum is irrelevant and 
misguided for three reasons: (1) the identity of his employer is irrelevant to the outcome because 
his employment relationship is governed by an undisputed agreement; (2) the Court was 
presented with Melvin's W-2 establishing that his employer was Franklin Covey Client Sales, 
Inc., (Exhibit D hereto) and (3) Melvin was provided with a copy of the actual assignment 
executed by the President of Franklin Covey Co. and the Vice President of Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. (Exhibit F hereto). 
CONCLUSION 
Melvin's Motions merely repeat defeated arguments and ask this Court to reach a 
different result. Having failed to demonstrate any "mistake," "newly discovered evidence" or 
"fraud," Melvin's 60(b) Motions must be denied. 
DATED this 3 1 day of October, 1998. 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & 
BEDNAR, LLC 
2f^/C 
Steven C. Bednar 
James L. Barnett 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. 
and Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.'s Vice President, a copy of which was previously provided to Melvin and is 
attached hereto as Exhibit F. Melvin fails to explain how the filing of the Consent and the execution of the 
Assignment by authorized individuals rises to the level of fraud, much less how he was harmed by gaining 
additional security. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Franklin Covey's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Melvin's Motions for Relief from Judgment or Order to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, this AV ^ ^ a y of October, 1998, to the following: 
Mark L. Hessel, Esq. 
Suite 307 
11501 Georgia Avenue 
Wheaton, MD 20902 
Marsha Ostrer 
Ostrer & Associates 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Springs, MD 20901 
David Melvin 
812 Whittington Terrace 





MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar #5660 
Candice Anderson #7456 
370 East South Temple, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-5678 
3 f 4 1998 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. 
SStyoST 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVID MELVIN, an individual, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 980901616 MI 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendant David Melvin's Motion(s) to Dismiss and Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client 
Sales, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court on July 26,1998. Steven C. 
Bednar appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. and on behalf of 
Franklin Covey Co.1 Defendant David Melvin did not appear at the hearing. The Court 
Franklin Covey Co. is not a named party to this action but has previously filed a pleading entitled Consent 
to Be Bound By Judgment and Assignment. 
#6793 
oo^ 
announced the rulings set forth in this Order based upon the Memoranda submitted by the parties 
and without oral argument. 
The Court, having read briefs and memoranda submitted by the parties and the 
accompanying attachments and having considered the relevant authorities, hereby orders as 
follows: Defendant's Motion(s) to Dismiss are hereby DENIED.2 With respect to Plaintiff 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, there are no genuine issues 
of material fact and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED. 
David Melvin 
2Defendant David Melvin filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Change Venue while this 
action was pending in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. Defendant also filed a Motion to 
Dismiss after remand to this Court Both Motions assert a lack of personal jurisdiction which the Court finds 
unmeritorious. The Alterative Motion to Transfer Venue raised in Defendant's First Motion to Dismiss became 
moot upon remand. Other arguments raised in Defendant's Motion(s) to Dismiss are subsumed in this Court's 




FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MjJm-, 
s5*rLAKECOOmY . . 
Deputy Ctaifc 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar #5660 
Candice Anderson #7456 
370 East South Temple, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5678 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
DAVID MELVIN, an individual, 
Defendant. 
D E C L A R A T O R Y 
J U D G M E N T 
Civil No. 980901616 MI 
Judge David S. Young 
The Court hereby enters judgment in this Declaratory Judgment Action as follows: 
1. Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. is a "person interested" under the Utah 
Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq. Plaintiff is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Franklin Covey Co. Franklin Covey Co. has consented to be bound by the 
Judgment filed in this action to the same extent as Plaintiff. This Declaratory Judgment is 
M794 
therefore binding upon both Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. and Franklin Covey Co. 
(hereinafter "Franklin Covey.")1 
2. The Court hereby declares the rights, status, legal relations and obligations of 
Franklin Covey and Defendant Melvin arising from Defendant Melvin's employment with 
Franklin Covey as follows: (1) Franklin Covey has no contractual, implied or other obligation to 
pay Defendant Melvin commissions or any other compensation related to seminars held or future 
seminars scheduled to be held or products sold subsequent to the September 12, 1997 effective 
date of Defendant Melvin's separation from Franklin Covey; (2) the Release signed by Defendant 
Melvin on November 13, 1997 bars all claims related to payment of compensation or 
commissions for services performed by Melvin during his employment with Franklin; and (3) 
Franklin's policy and practice with respect to the payment of commissions to separated Account 
Executives is not violative of law.2 
3. The parties shall each bear their own costs and attorneys1 fees in this action. 
The Court acknowledges that Defendant Melvin contends that his actual employer was Franklin Covey 
Co. and not Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. However, the Court finds that it is immaterial whether Defendant 
Melvin was employed by Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. or Franklin Covey Co. This action concerns only one 
employee, one employer, and only one employment relationship. The relevant terms of Defendant Melvin's 
employment relationship are established by an undisputed compensation agreement under which the rights, status, 
and legal relations of the parties are hereby determined. 
2
 The Court finds that the declaratory relief furnished herein is required under both Utah and Maryland 
law. The Court is therefore not required to determine which law applies to this dispute. 
#6794 2 




OSTRER Sc ASSOCIATES 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 
(301) 593-9083 FAX (301) 593-2987 
Email: Mostrer@edc.org 
September 10, 1998 
To: Steven Bednar 
From: Marsha Ostrer 
Re: Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. David Melvin 
This will serve to confirm our conversation of September 9, 1998 in which I informed you 
that I will be representing Mr. Melvin in the above en tided case. As I explained die Pro Hac 
Vice papers have been completed and sent to local Utah counsel who has informed me diat 
he will be filing diem this week. 
Per our conversation once the papers are filed and approved please send all correspondence 
and direct all communications to me. As you know, Mr. Melvin is my husband. To avoid 
improper communications please address all mail to my attendon at the Whittington Terrace 
address, contact me on the 9083 phone number and die 2987 fax number. My email address 
is also included for your convenience. Furthermore, please forward all copies of any 
documents, correspondence etc. related to this case direcdy to me once the Pro Hac Vice 
papers have been approved. I believe that in the Maryland case while you did, in tact, have 
local counsel, you requested our lawyer, Mr. Hessel, serve you direcdy and keep you 
personally informed of all aspects of the case radier than dealing with local Maryland counsel 
direcdy. I hereby make the same request of you regarding the Utah case. 
I believe this covers die main topics of our conversation and addresses die issues you ask me 
to address. 
OSTRER & ASSOCIATES 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 
(301) 593-9083 FAX (301) 593-2987 
Email: Mostrer@edc.org 
October 6,1998 
To: Steven Bednar . 
From: Marsha Ostrer Jlr 
Re: Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. David Melvin 
In my letter to you of September 10, 1998,1 confirmed my intention of apolyingPro Hac 
Vice to represent Mr. Melvin in the above entitled case. That intention remains, though 
unfortunately the local counsel with whom I had made arrangements has succumbed to a 
medical condition that has left him unable to complete the necessary tasks. He, and I, will 
be deciding how to proceed this week. 
However, as you know, there are filings and other matters that need to go forward in this 
case. Therefore, Mr. Melvin will be proceeding^? se for die present Since I do not 
formally represent him, I cannot speak on his behalf. I would suggest that the best way for 
the two of you to communicate is as you have in the past - by letter and fax. 
A communication from Mr. Melvin to you, along with additional items are enclosed. 
EXHIBIT D 
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EXHIBIT E 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar #5660 
Candice Anderson #7456 
370 East South Temple, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5678 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
V . j 
DAVID MELVIN, an individual, 
Defendant. 
) FRANKLIN COVEY CO. 
) CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY 
) JUDGMENT AND ASSIGNMENT 
i Civil No. 980901616 MI 
1 Judge David S. Young 
Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Plaintiff') is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Franklin Covey Co. Defendant David Melvin ("Defendant") contends that Franklin Covey Co., 
rather than Plaintiff, was his employer and is thus the real party-in-interest in this action. 
Franklin Covey Co. hereby asserts that Plaintiff was, in fact, Defendant's employer during the 
relevant time period and that Plaintiff is the real party-in-interest in this action. Nevertheless, 
Franklin Covey Co. hereby consents to be bound by the Judgment entered in this action to the 




Further, Franklin Covey Co. hereby acknowledges an assignment to Plaintiff of any rights which 
may be necessary (if any) to entitle Plaintiff to prosecute this action as the real-party-in-interest 
DATED this 2 _ day of June 1998. 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar 
Candice Anderson 
Attorneys For Franklin Covey Co. 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing FRANKLIN COVEY 
CO. CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY JUDGMENT AND ASSIGNMENT to be mailed, postage 
prepaid this day of June, 1998 to the following: 
Mark L. HesseL Esq. 
Suite 307 
11501 Georgia Avenue 
Wheaton, MD 20902 
David Melvin 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 
Y
*J V 7%LJL^ 
EXHIBIT F 
ASSIGNMENT 
THIS ASSIGNMENT is entered into effective the 1st day of January, 1998, by 
and between FRANKLIN COVEY CO, a Utah corporation ("Assignor"),aad 
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, INC, a Utah corporation ("Assignee"). 
Assignor assigns to Assignee any and all rights and obligations relating to or 
arising out of David Melvin's employment with Assignor. Specifically, Assignor assigns 
to Assignee any and all rights that may be necessary, if any, to entitle Assignee to 
prosecute, as the real party in interest, any legal proceedings concerning David Mcivin. 
Assignee hereby accepts Assignor's assignment of any and all rights and 
obligations relating to or arising out of David Melvin's employment with Franklin Covey 
Co. 
FRANKLIN COVEY CO. FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, 
INC. 
Tab 13 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 










CASE NO. 980901616 
DATE 11/10/987* 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
PLAINTIFF ATTY. 
DEFENDANT ATTY. 
BEDNAR, STEVEN C. 
KAPLAN, NEIL A. 
OSTRER, MARSHA A. 
The Court has before it for decision four motions filed by 
the Defendant David Melvin at a time when he was proceeding pro 
se in this case. The Court notes that the Pro Hac Vice 
application of Ms. Osterer was approved and signed by the Court 
on October 30, 1998. As to the four motions up for decision, the 
Court rules as follows: 
1) Defendant's Motion for Extension of time for Appeal is 
denied based on his non-compliance with the rules governing 
appellate procedure. Under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure (URAP), Defendant had 30 days from the date of judgment 
in which to file a notice of appeal. The judgment was entered on 
July 27, 1998, thus Defendant had until August 26 to file. 
However, his notice of appeal was not filed until September 11. 
Thus, Defendant then had to file a motion for extension of 
time for appeal. Under Rule 4(e) of URAP, defendant could file an 
ex parte motion for extension of time only within the first 30 
days after judgment. Because he did not file his motion for 
extension until September 22, 1998, it was required to be non ex-
parte, that is, with notice to the other side. However, this 
motion was ex parte, and thus was denied by the Court. 
Subsequently, Defendant did file a motion for extension of time 
and gave notice to plaintiff. This motion was filed on October 8. 
However, under Rule 4(e), a non ex-parte motion for extension of 
time must be filed within 60 days of the data of judgment. This 
means that the motion for extension needed to be filed by 
September 25. Having been filed October 8, the motion is 
untimely, and, as stated, the motion for extension fo time for 
appeal is denied. 
2 
2) Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order 
under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP), is 
denied. The Court finds that there is no basis for this motion. 
Defendant has not demonstrated the existence of mistake, neglect, 
newly discovered evidence or fraud that would warrant relief from 
judgment. 
3) Defendant's Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment is 
denied. Though Rule 62 of the URCP does provide that a Court may 
stay enforcement of judgment, there must be a showing by the 
moving party that such stay is needed to prevent an injustice. 
Defendant states no basis upon which a stay would be required to 
prevent an injustice. 
4) Defendant's Motion for Sanctions is denied. There is no 
basis upon which this motion could be granted. Defendant contends 
that Plaintiff's Counsel violated Rule 11 when it filed a 
pleading on behalf of "Franklin Covey co." and not the party in 
the case, "Franklin Covey Client Sales." Because of the fact that 
"Franklin Covey Client Sales" is the wholly owned subsidary of 
"Franklin Covey Co.", and because the relationship between these 
two entities has been known to Defendant throughout, the Court 
finds this argument without merit. 
3 
To reiterate, each of the four motions filed by the 
defendant pro se and submitted to the Court are denied. 




CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 980901616 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail MARSHA A OSTRER 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Spring, MD 20901 
Mail STEVEN C BEDNAR 
3 70 EAST SO TEMPLE SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841110000 
Mail NEIL A KAPLAN 
ONE UTAH CNTR STE 1000 
201 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84111-2216 
Dated t h i s /(* day of /}&7) ' 19 ' ^ 
ML 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) Uo 
Tab 14 
'JT.-.H 
NEIL A. KAPLAN, Esq. #3974 
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS Sc SWENSON, P.C 
1 Utah Center, Suite 1300 
201 S. Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2216 
Telephone (801) 322-2516 
MARSHA A. OSTRER, Esq. 
OSTRER & ASSOCIATES 
812 Whitungton Terrace 
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 
Telephone (301) 593-9083 
Attorneys for Defendant David Melvin 
,~.V" 2 
F-V:-._ , 
Thirr o j u„\.:. _ ;..ici 
DEC 0 8 1258 
SALTJL-.Xi CC .^ TY 
OUCtAfa^ 
Cw~ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 





Trial Court No: 980901616MI 
Judge David S. Young 
Supreme Court No. 981578 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Notice is hereby given that David Melvin appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final 
judgment of the trial court entered in the above-entitled case on November 10, 1998. 
This appeal is taken from the entire judgment entered on November 10, (998. 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on December^, 1998,1 served a copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Appeal on counsel for the appellee, Steven Bednar 370 East South Temple, Suite 200, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 by first class mail, postage prepaid. 
yu&fr 
Weil (A. Kaplan ' 
Datc:j)£<^W S,/T7* 
yL'JMU 
Neil Jt Kaplan J 
Marsha A. €fetrer 
Attorney's for Appellant David 
Melvin 
(,M 
OSTRER & ASSOCIATES 
812 Whittingtoa Terrace 
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 
(301) 593-9083 FAX (301) 593-2987 
Email: mo6irei@edc.org 
December 15, 1998 
To: Ms. Bunny Neuenschwander 
Scott M. Matheson Courthouse 
450 South State Street 
3* Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Confirmation of Acknowledgment of Filing of Transcript: 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, Civil Case No. 980901616 MI 
Dear Ms. Neuenschwander: 
This is to acknowledge that a request for a transcript of the hearing held in the above 
entitled case before Judge David S. Young on June 26, 1998 was requested and was 
prepared, certified and filed with the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the certified copy having been transcribed and attested to on 
September 23, 1998. 
Further, this will acknowledge our conversation of last month in which you informed me 
that you had filed an acknowledgment with the Clerk of the Supreme Court as previously 




Marsh* ft. Ostrer 
cc: Clerk of the Third Judicial Court in and for Salt Lake County 
Clerk, Utah Supreme Court 
Mr. Steven Bednar, attorney for appellee 
Tab 15 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
—00O00—- . _ JU-RIED DlSTRta COURT 
Third Judicial District 
imrajuuv, REMITTITUR 
fEB 0 4 1999
 { No.981578-SC Franklin Covey Client Sales, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ^ S * ° v ^ ^ 
vs. 
David Melvin, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Third District Court 
Salt Lake Dept. 
No. 980901616 
Per ORDER OF DISMISSAL. 
Order Issued: December 9,1998 
Remittitur Issued: February 3,1999 
Record: None. 
i, the undersigned, Clerk of tiie Utah Suprcrr..; 
Court, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a 
true and correct copy of an original document 
on file in the Utah Supreme Court In testimony 
whereof ,1 have MTlfiyTteriff Ih^affSeffWOear 
<*c«t Qtfty gaJsUttu^ 
Pat H. Bartholomew 
Clerk g4ht Cow* *-
By W!(M<tt<(t* • ••••• 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, No. 981578 
Inc., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
David Melvin, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
Appellee's motion to dismiss this appeal is hereby 
granted. The notice of appeal was not filed in a timely manner, 
and this court lacks jurisdiction. Utah R. App. P. 10(a)(1). 
BY THE COURT: 
Date Zk<=. i, mr KsCc&*" 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF U,TAH 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, 
PLAINTIFF , 
(jL/iia6<r(aJL 
VS. CASE NO. 980901616 
DAVID MELVIN, 
DEFENDANT 
* * * * * 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
(HEARING ON MOTIONS) 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
JUNE 26, 19 95 
^CvC^Ocx 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
STEVEN C. BEDNAR ATTORNEY AT LAW 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
370 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE, #300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 




SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; 
P R O C E E D I N G 
THE COURT: THE MATTER 
VS. DAVID MELVIN. THIS IS CASE 
JUNE 2 6 
S 
, 1995; 
OF FRANKLIN COVEY 
NUMBER 98090116. 
FOR THE RECORD, SIR, WILL YOU STATE YOUR 
STEVEN BEDNAR: STEVE BEDNAR ON 
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, INC. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
JUST WANT TO BRIEFLY RECITE SOME 
UNDERSTAND YOUR CASE. 
NOW, MR. 
HISTORY, 
APPARENTLY, THIS CASE WAS FILED, 
REMOVED TO THE FEDERAL COURT. 
ISSUED ORDER THAT IT SHOULD NOT 
JUDGE 
HAVE 
THERE. I THINK IT DOES NOT MEET THE 
FINANCIAL LEVEL. 
MR. BEDNAR: CORRECT. 
THE COURT: AND IT HAS BEEN 
THIS COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. 










AND YOU HAVE 
ON THE BASIS 
THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE NO OBLIGATION TO PAY 
DATE, IF I RECALL, OF SEPTEMBER 
IS THAT ACCURATE? 
MR. BEDNAR: EXACTLY. 
12, • 97 . 
BEYOND THE 
4 
THE COURT: I'VE READ THE PLEADINGS IN THIS 
CASE. I WILL TELL YOU THAT OBVIOUSLY THERE HAVE 
BEEN SUBSTANTIAL PLEADINGS PILED IN OPPOSITION IN 
YOUR CASE, AND THE PLEADINGS ARE PRO SE. 
MR. MELVIN IS DOING THOSE HIMSELF, AND 
LIKELY WITH HELP WITH HIS WIFE. WE'VE HAD 
SUBSTANTIAL CALLS FROM HIS WIFE, AND FINALLY HAVE 
HAD TO INDICATE, AND I'LL JUST STATE THIS BECAUSE I 
AM ON THE RECORD, THAT WE COULD NO LONGER 
COMMUNICATE WITH HER. SHE WAS ASKING US SUBSTANTIVE 
QUESTIONS IN HIS BEHALF AND ACTING AS THOUGH SHE 
WERE HIS ATTORNEY. 
SO SINCE HE'S ACTING PRO SE, WE INFORMED 
HER THAT WE COULD ONLY COMMUNICATE WITH MR. MELVIN 
PERSONALLY, OR WITH COUNSEL. 
NOW, HE HAD A COUNSEL IN MARYLAND, I THINK 
HIS NAME WAS HESSELL. 
MR. BEDNAR: HE HAS COUNSEL IN MARYLAND. 
THERE'S A PARALLEL PROCEEDING VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL TO 
THIS ONE PENDING IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND. HE'S REPRESENTED BY 
MARK HESSELL IN THOSE PROCEEDINGS. 
MR. HESSELL HAS AT LEAST ACTED AS NOTARY 
PUBLIC ON SIGNING THE AFFIDAVITS. 
THE COURT: LIKELY DOING THE GHOST 
PLEADING. 
WELL, IT APPEARS TO ME THAT YOUR POSITION 
IN RELATION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS MERITORIOUS, THAT 
THE CONTRACTS ARE CLEAR, THAT HIS WAIVER AT THE 
CONCLUSION OF THE AGREEMENT WHEN HE RECEIVED THE 
ULTIMATE COMPENSATION IN PLUS OR MINUS NOVEMBER OF 
1997 BARS HIM FROM FURTHER ACTION IN THIS CASE. 
SO YOUR MOTION IS GRANTED. IF YOU'LL 
PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT WITH YOUR PLEADINGS AND 
CONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S RULING. 
MR. BEDNAR: I WILL, YOUR HONOR. 
ONE OTHER MATTER THAT I SHOULD BRING TO 
YOUR ATTENTION. THERE IS A JURISDICTIONAL MATTER 
THAT I SHOULD BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION. THERE IS A 
JURISDICTIONAL MOTION THAT MR. MELVIN FILED, AND 
THAT WAS FULLY BRIEFED BEFORE JUDGE BENSON. 
AND I WOULD WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT THE 
COURT IS AWARE THAT THAT THERE IS A PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION MOTION THAT IS PENDING AND THAT HAS 
BEEN SUBMITTED FOR DECISION. 
IF THE COURT WISHES TO REACH THAT, IT HAS 
BEEN SUBMITTED AND IT'S FULLY BRIEFED. 
THE COURT: REMIND ME OF THE ISSUE. I 
THINK I'VE READ ALL THE PLEADINAGS. 
MR. BEDNAR: MR. MELVIN CONTENDS THAT HE IS 
NOT SUBJECT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN UTAH. 
THE COURT: DON'T YOUR UNDERLYING CONTRACTS 
ORIGINATE IN UTAH, AND ARE THEY SUBJECT TO 
INTERPRETATION BY UTAH COURTS? 
MR. BEDNAR: THE LETTER AGREEMENT THAT 
DETERMINES HIS COMPENSATION DOES NOT HAVE A CHOICE 
OF LAW OR VENUE PROVISION. OUR BASIS FOR SUSTAINING 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION IS THAT MR. MELVIN IN HIS 
COMPLAINT IN MARYLAND ALLEGES THAT HE CAME HERE TO 
UTAH, THAT HE CONDUCTED BUSINESS HERE BY ATTEMPTING 
TO RECRUIT CLIENTS, AND HE IS SEEKING COMPENSATION. 
THAT VERY ACTIVITY, AND THAT, THEREFORE, SPECIFIC 
PERSONAL JURUSDICTION DOES EXIST. 
BUT IT MAY BE WISE TO MAKE A RULING ON THAT 
MOTION. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THE COURT FINDS 
THAT THERE IS PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE, AS 
WELL, CONSISTENT WITH LAW AND THE PLEADINGS. 
MR. BEDNAR: AND I SHOULD MAKE AN ORDER FOR 
BOTH MOTIONS, THEN? 
THE COURT: INDEED. 
MR. BEDNAR: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED.) 
1 C E R T I F I C A T E 
2 STATE OF UTAH 
3 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE : 
4 I, GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, AM AN EMPLOYEE OF THE 
5 STATE OF UTAH COURT SYSTEM. 
6 I I TRANSCIBED THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPT FROM 
7 VIDEOTAPED PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY. 
8 THAT SAID TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTES TO THE 
9 BEST OF MY ABILITY A TRUE AND COMPLETE RECORD OF THE 
10 PROCEEDINGS HAD. 
11 IN WITNESS THEREOF, I HAVE SUBSCRIBED MY 
12 | NAME AND SEAL THIS 23TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1998. 
13 
14 __^^^^£.Z^5«2^^1 
15 I GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, CSR, RPR 
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